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I. INTRODUCTION
In a complex economy, many business transactions take place se-
quentially-one party performs in part or in full before the other side
executes its side of the bargain. Sequencing has many advantages, but
it creates an unfortunate incentive. Having received its benefit from the
bargain, the party who is to perform last may be tempted to renege on
its obligations. Law and economics scholars often describe the conduct
of a reneging party in these situations as "opportunistic."1 The reneging
party, perceiving an opportunity to increase its gain, yields to tempta-
tion and refuses to perform. The law of contract helps to diminish the
danger of opportunism by providing assurance to those performing first
that their contracting partners can be held accountable if they renege.2
1. The term "opportunism" has a number of meanings that are explored more fully in Part 11
of this Article. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
2. By establishing penalties for nonperformance, the law gives parties the power to commit
themselves credibly to future obligations. R. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 50 (1990)
(arguing that "the rules of contract law enable the making of commitments to buy and sell that
unfold over time rather than being performed at the same instant"); Baird, Self-Interest and Co-
operation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 584 (1990) (asserting that the mutual
suspicion arising from commercial situations in which parties cannot be sure whether the other
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Accountability reduces the risk of entering business transactions and
facilitates an atmosphere of confidence conducive to exchange.
3
Recently, scholars have explored the dangers of opportunism even
after a contract is formed.4 If performance under the contract requires
one side to invest in assets specially tailored to the transaction, 5 the
other side may be tempted to exploit this postcontractual situation by
renegotiating the original terms to capture more of the bargaining sur-
plus.' The same postcontractual opportunistic incentives exist when one
side becomes dependent on unique skills or knowledge acquired by the
party will perform is "one of the justifications for contract law").
3. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.) (stating that "the most important thing which [the law of contracts] does is to
facilitate exchanges that are not simultaneous by preventing either party from taking advantage of
the vulnerabilities to which sequential performance may give rise").
4. The literature on postcontractual opportunism has covered an increasing number of legal
topics. See, e.g., Butler & Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade As Contractual Integration: A
Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization
Theory, 32 EmORY L.J. 1009 (1983) (antitrust law); Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99
YALz L.J. 131 (1989) (lender-borrower relations); Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate
Law, 89 CoLum L. Rv. 1549, 1573-85 (1989) (shareholder opportunism in the adoption of charter
amendments); Graham & Peirce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up
Game, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989) (contract modification); Hadfield, Problematic Rela-
tions: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1990) (franchising);
Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a
Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. RE V. 751, 783, 790-95 (1988) (leasing); Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981) (contract modification, good faith
in performance, tender of nonconforming goods, franchising, and penalty clauses); Narasimhan,
Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61 (1987) [hereinafter
Narasimhan, Modification] (contract modification); Narasimhan, Relationship or Boundary? Han-
dling Successive Contracts, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1077 (1989) [hereinafter Narasimhan, Relationship
or Boundary] (renegotiation of successive contracts); Robison, Enforcing Extorted Contract Modi-
fications, 68 IowA L. REv. 699 (1983) (contract modification); Williamson, Corporate Governance,
93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1203 (1984) (governance of public corporations); Note, Employer Opportunism
and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HIv. L. Rv. 510 (1989) (termination of at-will
employees).
5. These investments are labeled "contract-specific" or "transaction-specific" assets. See Fis-
chel, supra note 4, at 149-50; infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4, at 1589. Professor Jeffrey Gordon states:
If performance is not simultaneous, one party will have invested greater resources in perform-
ance, or in reliance, than the other at any given time. These sunk costs, in combination with a
damage measure that is not fully compensatory, give the other party the opportunity to rene-
gotiate the contract on more favorable terms.
Id. (footnote omitted). Investment of contract-specific assets or skills is really part of the more
general problem that arises when a party becomes isolated from market forces as contract perform-
ance progresses. See Muris, supra note 4, at 522-23. This isolation allows the other party to extract
extra compensation as a condition of continuing to perform its obligations. A number of contract
doctrines discourage this behavior, including the doctrine of consideration. See, e.g., Alaska Pack-
ers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (holding a contract modification demanded by
sailors in mid-voyage unenforceable for lack of consideration); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw 87 (3d ed. 1986).
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other side after performance has begun.7
This scholarly interest in postcontractual opportunism has not ex-
tended to the precontractual stage of business dealings.8 Law and eco-
nomics scholars have assumed that parties in the precontractual stage
are not likely to invest heavily in contract-specific assets and that the
costs of finding suitable substitutes for performance are relatively low.9
More traditional doctrinal scholars likewise have failed to explore the
concept of opportunism in their analyses of precontractual legal regula-
tion.10 Both groups' approaches reflect traditional doctrinal distinctions,
which sharply differentiate between precontractual and postcontractual
dealings. 1
7. See, e.g., Butler & Baysinger, supra note 4, at 1016 (describing the example of an attor-
ney who gained specialized knowledge of a client's case and used the knowledge as leverage to
renegotiate the fee); Williamson, Wachter & Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation:
The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 250 (1975) (discussing the market
for employees in which on-the-job training is crucial).
8. In theory, economists view opportunism as a pervasive phenomenon that can arise "dur-
ing original negotiations, during contract execution, and at contract renewal stages. Strategic be-
havior is involved in all cases." Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 7, at 259. Precontractual
opportunism, however, has been discounted in favor of postcontractual opportunism in which par-
ties have invested in contract-specific assets or skills. See, e.g., Lorenz, Neither Friends nor Stran-
gers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry, in TauS. MAXNG AND BaREuNG
CoopzTrIVE RELATIONS 198 (D. Gambetta ed. 1988) [hereinafter CooPE mtAv RELA7oNS] (sug-
gesting that opportunism is "obvious enough in the case of contract enforcement, but perhaps less
so in those of negotiation and adaptation"); see also Butler & Baysinger, supra note 4, at 1015-16
(asserting that opportunism occurs because of "postcontractual manipulation of the terms of
trade"); Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obli-
gation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 982-83 (1983) (arguing that opportunistic behavior affects "renegoti-
ation more than original negotiations"); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 297 (1978)
(discussing the problem of "postcontractual opportunistic behavior"); Muris, supra note 4, at 523.
9. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 8, at 972 (asserting that "where a developed market
for substitute performance exists, the potential for opportunism is negligible"); Muris, supra note
4, at 523-24 (finding that if another performing party "were available post contract,. . . credibly
no incentive for opportunism would exist"); Narasimhan, Relationship or Boundary, supra note 4,
at 1081-82 (arguing that precontractual opportunism based on relational factors is "likely to be
infrequent, especially in business settings," and opportunism based on information asymmetries is
controlled adequately through implied warranties and legal doctrines that require accurate infor-
mation disclosures).
10. See, e.g., Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance. Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formali-
ties, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 443 (1987); Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability
and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. Rnv. 217
(1987); Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1984); Gergen,
Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1990); Metzger & Phillips, The
Emergence of Promissory Estoppel As an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RuTGRms L. Rzv.
472 (1983).
11. Both the common law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981), and the
Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987), impose a general duty of "good faith" in the
performance and enforcement of contracts. Both sources, however, disclaim any good faith duty
during the negotiation of agreements. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment c
(stating that "[b]ad faith in negotiation" is not within the scope of the section dealing with the
TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS
This Article challenges the assumptions of law and economics
scholars regarding precontractual opportunism and seeks to fill a signif-
icant gap in the doctrinal analysis of commercial negotiation. First, the
Article argues that the dangers of opportunism arise in the precontrac-
tual stages of business relations more frequently than law and econom-
ics literature has recognized. 2 Opportunism often is more subtle in
initial negotiations than in long-term contracts, and precontractual
losses usually are more modest than those in the postcontractual cases.
Nevertheless, a case survey reveals recurring fact patterns that point
strongly toward the presence of opportunism in the initial negotiation
of agreements.
Second, as a normative matter, the Article posits that legal
doctrines regulating the precontractual stage can be made more precise
and effective by directly introducing the concept of opportunism into
the law. Third, the Article argues that regulation of precontractual
opportunism is appropriate because opportunistic behavior during bar-
gaining undermines one of the fundamental psychological conditions
for the successful coordination of complex commercial
transactions-interpersonal trust."8  Social psychologists,'14  sociolo-
duty of good faith in performance and enforcement of contracts); U.C.C. § 1-203. The Seventh
Circuit recently stated:
In a business transaction both sides presumably try to get the best of the deal. That is the
essence of bargaining and the free market.... [N]o legal rule bounds the run of business
interest. So one cannot characterize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in nego-
tiations could be termed dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other party. The
proper recourse is to walk away from the bargaining table, not to sue for "bad faith" in
negotiations.
Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988).
German and Japanese law take a contrary view and impose a general obligation of good faith
in the formation of contracts. See Z. KITIGAWA, DOING BusINEss IN JAPAN § 1.03[3][b] (1989)
(equating the Japanese law concept of "keiyaki teiketsu-jo no kashitsu" to the German law concept
of "culpa in contrahendo," or fault in contracting); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bar-
gaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 401
(1964) (discussing "culpa in contrahendo"); see also A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIvIL LAW
SysTsM 837-40 (2d ed. 1977); Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 239-41 & n.84 (discussing the law of
bargaining in good faith in Germany, Japan, Argentina, Israel, Italy, and Yugoslavia).
12. See infra notes 60-133 and accompanying text.
13. Lorenz, supra note 8, at 201 (suggesting that "the problem of trust in economic exchange
is raised by the potential for opportunism inherent in investment in specific assets").
14. See, e.g., M. DETrscH, THE RESOLUTION OF CoNnicT 143 (1973) (arguing that "learned
men throughout the ages" have disagreed about whether to trust or not, but they agree about the
importance of the subject); D. PRurrr, NEGOTIATION BEHAviOR 92, 100 (1981) (stating that "trust
encourages coordinative behavior by reducing the danger of [loss]" from high-risk bargaining be-
havior, and "even low-risk forms require some degree of trust"); Golembiewski & McConkie, The
Centrality of Interpersonal Trust in Group Processes, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 131 (C.
Cooper ed. 1975) (stating that "[p]erhaps there is no single variable which so thoroughly influences
interpersonal and group behavior"). Marketing scholars also have identified interpersonal trust as
the key to successful commercial dealings. See, e.g., Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller
1991]
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gists, 5 economists,"6 philosophers, 17 and legal scholars s all have recog-
nized that trust is central to the efficient coordination of human goals.
Once trust is established, commercial parties are better able to take
risks that are necessary to coordinate transactions.1" Without trust, par-
ties must resort to costly mechanisms such as simultaneous exchanges,
precontractual contracts, or deposits to reduce suspicion of one an-
other's motives to manageable levels.20 If these mechanisms are unavail-
able, parties may forego transactions altogether.
Relationships, 51 J. MARKETING 11, 18 (1987) (discussing the importance of trust in the "explora-
tion" phase of commercial relationships as a device to understand "expectations for cooperation
and planning in a relational contract"); Hawes, Mast & Swan, Trust Earning Perceptions of Sell-
ers and Buyers, 9 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 1, 1 (1989) (asserting that "[tirust is the bind-
ing force in most productive buyer/seller relationships"); Schurr & Ozanne, Influences on
Exchange Processes: Buyers' Preconceptions of a Seller's Trustworthiness and Bargaining
Toughness, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 939, 939 (1985) (writing that "theories of dyadic behavior have
long held that trust is an essential ingredient in cooperation and agreement").
15. See, e.g., B. BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 166 (1983) (noting that trust is
"one essential source of social order"); N. LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1973); Zucker, Production
of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920, 8 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv.
53, 56 (1986) (asserting that "[tirust has been acknowledged in economic and organization theory
as the most efficient mechanism for governing transactions, and in sociology as 'essential for stable
social relationships,' vital for maintenance of cooperation in society, or necessary as grounds for
even the most routine, everyday interaction").
16. See, e.g., R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON x (1988) (observing the importance of trust
in commercial ventures); R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 238-39 (noting that "trustworthiness" reduces
"costs of transactions"); Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONoMIc THE-
ORY 24 (E. Phelps ed. 1975) [hereinafter ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONoMIc THEORY] (stating that
"[v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust"); McKean, Eco-
nomics of Trust, Altruism, and Corporate Responsibility, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC
THEORY, supra, at 29 (positing that greater ability to trust "would save many costs").
17. See, e.g., Baer, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 232 (1986) (stating that "any forn
of cooperative activity, including the division of labor, requires the cooperators to trust one an-
other to do their bit, or at the very least to trust the overseer with his whip to do his bit, where
coercion is relied on"); Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 920 (1990) (re-
marking on the "minimum of trust that is the prime constituent of the social atmosphere in which
all human interaction takes. place" and stating that "too high a level of distrust stifles efforts at
cooperation as much as severe pollution impairs health").
18. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "In-
visible Handshake," 52 U. CHL L. REV. 903, 905-06 (1985) (arguing that trust is a "moral value"
and that exceptions to the doctrine of consideration are all based on legal policy of protecting "the
ability of individuals to trust promises in circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial");
Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REv. 797, 821-23
(1973) (discussing "the problem of trust" in connection with social coordination); Macneil, Values
in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 340, 348-49 (1983) (speaking of "solidarity"
as a basic trait in human nature that enables humans to resolve the contradiction of being both
selfish and unselfish at the same time and defining solidarity as "a belief in being able to depend
on another").
19. See D. PRUITT, supra note 14, at 100-01 (asserting that trust permits parties to take high-
risk coordinative behaviors, such as large concessions, proposals for compromise, unilateral ten-
sion-reduction steps, and candid disclosures of motive and priority); infra notes 152-56, 183-85 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS
Until now, scholarship regarding the relationship between law and
trust has been lacking. Legal economists have discounted trust in their
analyses of legal regulation. 1 At the opposite extreme, more traditional
scholars have treated trust as a self-evident necessity of commercial
dealings without examining the social psychological mechanisms for
creating and maintaining trust. This Article addresses the shortcomings
of both law and economics theorists and traditional scholars. It does so
by exploring theoretical and empirical research on trust from the fields
of sociology and social psychology and linking that research to the judi-
cialy imposed legal penalties for precontractual opportunism.
Part II of this Article first discusses and defines commercial oppor-
tunism. Part II then describes the landscape of complex commercial ne-
gotiations. By exploring the wide variety of doctrines that courts have
manipulated to compensate victims of precontractual opportunistic
conduct, this section demonstrates that transaction-specific investments
are common in complex negotiations. Part III explores why precontrac-
tual opportunism is socially and economically undesirable. Part III ex-
amines sociological and social psychological literature on the dynamics
of interpersonal trust and asserts that precontractual transaction-spe-
cific investments are part of a vital trust-building process that under-
girds many commercial relationships. Part IV looks at the role of law in
supporting the construction of trusting commercial relationships. After
analyzing nonlegal methods of deterring opportunistic conduct and re-
viewing the costs of legal intervention, Part IV concludes that legal
rules proscribing opportunism in negotiation are justified as a means to
reinforce and support the process of building trust. Part IV then ex-
tends this analysis by suggesting a new cause of action to improve de-
terrence of precontractual opportunistic conduct. Part V concludes with
a summary and a suggestion for further research.
21. Law and economics literature is rich with articles on the role of law, particularly contract
law, in promoting commercial cooperation. None of these articles, however, explores the possibili-
ties of cooperation based on trust and the role of law in promoting trusting relationships. A leading
legal economist, Professor Robert Scott, recently suggested why trust is ignored. He argued:
[Commercial parties] behave under two sets of rules: a strict set of rules for legal enforcement
and a more flexible set of rules for social enforcement. It may be that the great lesson for the
courts is that any effort to judicialize these social rules will destroy the very informality that
makes them so effective in the first instance.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 615
(1990). Trust may be a psychological phenomenon that legal economists feel is best left to Scott's
realm of "social enforcement." Id.
1991]
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II. LEGAL REGULATION OF OPPORTUNISM IN COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS
A. Opportunism and Transaction-Specific Investments
The term "opportunism" is not defined precisely in either the legal
or economic literature. As commonly used, however, the term carries
negative connotations, describing instances in which someone reneges
on an agreement or understanding to take advantage of a new opportu-
nity.22 According to Professor Timothy Muris, commercial opportunism
arises when a performing party "behaves contrary to the other party's
understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the
other party to the performer.
' 28
Economist Oliver Williamson defines opportunism more broadly as
"self-interest seeking with guile. '24 Williamson emphasizes that oppor-
tunism is rooted in situations in which parties have asymmetric infor-
mation. He focuses on commercial exploitation that is based on
"selective or distorted information disclosure or . . . self-disbelieved
promises regarding future conduct." 2 According to Professor William-
son's broader definition, opportunism is a pervasive problem in business
dealings because parties almost always have different or unequal
amounts of information regarding facts, intentions, or interpretations
related to transactions.
26
This Article is concerned with a more narrowly framed form of op-
portunism than that presented by either Muris or Williamson. The Ar-
ticle focuses on precontractual bargaining situations in which parties
have invested transaction-specific resources. A branch of institutional
22. The term "opportunism" often is used to describe the behavior of politicians who alter
their positions when shifting political winds make adherence to previously announced principles
unpopular or inconvenient. See SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1454 (3d ed. 1973) (defining
opportunism as: "In politics, the policy of doing what is presently expedient, as opposed to rigid
adherence to party principles").
23. Muris, supra note 4, at 521; see also Butler & Baysinger, supra note 4, at 1015-16 (argu-
ing that "opportunism occurs when one party to a transaction recognizes that the other transactor
cannot economically retaliate against postcontractual manipulation of the terms of trade, and then
engages in such manipulation in order to effect an unexpected transfer of wealth from the other
transactor").
24. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26
(1975).
25. Williamson, Wachter & Harris, supra note 7, at 259. Williamson recently has elaborated
on this definition. He now writes that "opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclo-
sure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or oth-
erwise confuse." 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrALISM 47 (1985).
26. No commentator has yet undertaken a comprehensive study of the legal regulation of
"guile," in Williamson's broad sense. Similarly, this project is well beyond the scope of the present
inquiry. Those questioning the pervasiveness of guile in human affairs need only consult the story
of the Garden of Eden, in which the serpent convinced Eve that it had superior information re-
garding the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. Genesis 3:5 (King James).
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theory known as "transaction cost economics" helps to identify this fact
pattern as particularly likely to create opportunism problems.17
Transaction cost economics is essentially the study of the legal and
nonlegal mechanisms" used by parties to reduce the costs of negotiat-
ing, monitoring, and performing mutually beneficial agreements.2 9
Transaction cost theory makes two basic assumptions about human be-
havior. First, human beings have "bounded rationality"-less than per-
fect information about their contracting partners and future events.
Thus, they are incapable of knowing, understanding, or providing for all
possible contingencies in their relationships.30 Second, some people are
opportunistic and, if the chance arises, will serve their self-interests at
the expense of their contracting partners.3 '
Transaction cost economics adds to these assumptions the hypoth-
esis that asset specificity is the most vital indicator for describing trans-
actions.32 Given the assumption of bounded rationality, the danger of
opportunism will be most acute and noticeable when the transaction is
accompanied by investments in assets that are specifically tailored to
the transaction and cannot fully be salvaged outside the transaction.3 3
27. Williamson introduced the theory of transaction cost economics. For a full description of
this theory, see 0. WILUAMSON, supra note 25, at 15-42.
28. Williamson's work on transaction cost economics has emphasized nonlegal contractual
governance mechanisms. Id. at 29 (stating that property rights and mechanism-design literature
"work within the tradition of legal centralism," and "transaction cost economics disputes that
court ordering is efficacious"). Contract law scholars also have used a transaction cost approach to
explain why contract law doctrines sometimes reduce the transaction costs of contracting within a
legal system. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R PosNan, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRACT LAW 4 (1979);
Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261
(1980).
29. Williamson has explained that transaction costs "are the economic equivalent of friction
in physical systems." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 25, at 19. In a contractual relationship, examples
of friction include negotiating and communicating about an agreement, monitoring performance,
dealing with unexpected contingencies, and enforcing the contract if the agreement breaks down
before performance is complete. Some friction is inherent in the contracting process, but all parties
to an agreement benefit to the extent that these costs can be reduced. Legal philosophers critical
of economic approaches to the law have stated that "[n]o term in the philosopher's lexicon is more
imprecisely defined than is the economist's term 'transaction costs.' Almost anything counts as a
transaction cost." J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, PHsMOSOPHY OF LAW 217 (1990).
30. 0. WILIAMSON, supra note 25, at 44-47; Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67
N.C.L. REv. 517, 566-67 (1989). Many economic models assume for purposes of analysis that parties
have perfect information regarding themselves, each other, and the world in which they operate.
See, e.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). In contrast, transaction cost
economics makes no such assumption.
31. The term "opportunism" is used here in its broadest sense of "self-interest seeking with
guile." See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Transaction cost theory does not require that
parties always act opportunistically. It is enough that some people are inclined to act opportunisti-
cally and that it is difficult for nonopportunists to identify the opportunists in advance. 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 25, at 64-67.
32. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 25, at 30.
33. Id. at 53 (noting that "[t]ransactions that are supported by investments in durable,
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Thus, although opportunism is a danger whenever parties possess asym-
metric information, it becomes more likely when one side has taken af-
firmative, costly steps or has foregone unique alternatives which expose
that side to exploitation by the other side. Judge Richard Posner has
given the following example to illustrate the danger of opportunism
when specialized assets are the subject of a commercial transaction:
If A contracts to build a highly idiosyncratic gazebo for B, payment due on comple-
tion, and when A completes the gazebo B refuses to pay, A may be in a bind-since
the resale value of the gazebo may be much less than A's cost-except for his right
to sue B for the price. Even then, a right to sue for breach of contract, being costly
to enforce, is not a completely adequate remedy. B might therefore go to A and say,
"If you don't reduce your price I'll refuse to pay and put you to the expense of
suit"; and A might knuckle under.3
Transaction cost economics uses the concepts of asset specificity
and the resulting danger of opportunism to predict the form business
enterprises will take. In transactions marked by idiosyncratic assets and
an acute danger of opportunism, firms will forego bargaining in markets
altogether and completely internalize transactions by vertical integra-
tion, particularly when the type of exchange is likely to recur.3 5 As the
dimension of asset specificity changes, various forms of integrated com-
mercial exchange emerge, ranging from joint ventures and franchise re-
lations to complex contracting for construction projects and
conventional market transactions for nonspecialized, one-shot deals.3 6
The concepts of asset specificity and opportunism also have impli-
cations for the study of the legal regulation of contractual relations. As
transaction-specific assets experience 'lock-in' effects, on which account autonomous trading will
commonly be supplanted by unified ownership (vertical integration)"). Williamson has written:
The crucial investment distinction is this: to what degree are transaction-specific
(nonmarketable) expenses incurred. Items that are unspecialized among users pose few
hazards, since buyers in these circumstances can easily turn to alternative sources, and suppli-
ers can sell output intended for one order to other buyers without difficulty.
Nonmarketability problems arise when the specific identity of the parties has important cost-
bearing consequences. Transactions of this kind will be referred to as idiosyncratic.
William on, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
EcoN. 233, 239-40 (1979) (footnote omitted).
34. Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.). The assets in question need not be durable. Rather, they can take the form of human
knowledge. See supra note 7. Ordinary skills also can become highly specialized if the market for
replacements is remote. In Alaska Packers As'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), for exam-
ple, the defendant hired sailors in San Francisco to set up a fishing cannery in Alaska. Once the
ship had reached its remote port in Alaska, the sailors announced that they would not work unless
their wages were raised. Having no good alternatives, the defendant acquiesced to the demand. Id.
at 101. Later, the defendant reneged and refused to pay the new wages. The sailors sued, but the
court refused to enforce the revised contract on the grounds that it lacked consideration. Id. at
102.
35. 0. WEuLUSON, supra note 25, at 82-105, 240-72.
36. See Williamson, supra note 33, at 247-53.
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indicated earlier,37 legal scholars have utilized these concepts in analyz-
ing a number of problems that arise once commercial parties have es-
tablished a contractual relationship and performance is underway. For
example, several studies have explored the problem identified above by
Judge Posner: how should the law treat attempts to renegotiate the
terms of an agreement in mid-performance after contract-specific in-
vestments are in place?"8 Professor Subha Narasimhan recently has ex-
panded this analysis to situations dealing with successive discrete
contracts between the same parties.39 Still others have investigated op-
portunistic incentives that arise in ongoing contractual settings such as
franchising relationships, 40  employment relations, 41  and public
corporations. 2
Many law and economics scholars have concluded that legal regula-
tion of postcontractual opportunistic conduct either is unwarranted or
highly problematic. 4s They argue that market incentives such as a con-
cern for market reputation and the likelihood of repeated dealings with
the same parties are adequate mechanisms to police opportunistic be-
havior. 4 Moreover, business parties that are concerned with specific
forms of postcontractual opportunism may bargain explicitly to pro-
37. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Graham & Peirce, supra note 4; Muris, supra note 4; Narasimhan, Of Expecta-
tions, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1123 (1986);
Narasimhan, Modification, supra note 4; Robison, supra note 4.
39. Narasinhan, Relationship or Boundary, supra note 4.
40. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 4.
41. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4.
42. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 4; Williamson, supra note 33.
43. See, e.g., Butler & Baysinger, supra note 4, at 1109 (criticizing the use of antitrust laws
to curb opportunism and stating that all vertical restraints should be "per se legal"); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 295-96 (1986) (arguing
against giving minority shareholders in close corporations easy access to dissolution and
mandatory buyout remedies for bad faith actions by majority shareholders); Epstein, In Defense of
the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. Rv. 947, 951 (1984) (arguing that employers should be free to
terminate at-will employees unless the employment contract specifies otherwise); Fischel, supra
note 4, at 140-46 (arguing against giving debtors claims against lenders based on broad standards
of good faith); Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70
AM. EcoN. REv. 356, 359-60 (1980) (arguing that franchisors should have the power to terminate
franchisees at will unless the contract otherwise provides); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in
Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAun. L. REv. 2005, 2054 (1987) (advocating "traditional deference to
party autonomy," rather than a general good faith standard, in constructing legal rules to govern
postcontractual adjustment of commercial relations); Note, supra note 4, at 528-29 (agreeing that
employers should be able to terminate employees at will unless the contract specifies otherwise).
Dissenters include Professor Muris, who has argued that implied terms of good faith, properly
understood to address opportunistic behavior, play an important role, see Muris, supra note 4, at
572, and Professor Narasimhan, who has argued for a duty of good faith negotiation in the renewal
of successive contracts between the same parties under some circumstances. See Narasihnan, Re-
lationship or Boundary, supra note 4, at 1117-22.
44. See Epstein, supra note 43, at 968; Fischel, supra note 4, at 138.
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hibit opportunistic conduct in their original contract, eliminating the
need for noncontractual legal protection. 45 These scholars fear that the
creation of legal claims to deter opportunism may backfire and result in
groundless lawsuits by parties who took known risks at the outset of a
relationship, but became disappointed with the outcome of the transac-
tion. In short, these scholars recognize the danger of opportunism, but
worry that using the legal system to redress the problem could be worse
than the danger itself.
46
Law and economics scholars have not yet addressed comprehen-
sively the danger of opportunism in the precontractual period. It seems
clear, however, that their suspicion of postcontractual legal intervention
would make them leery of legal supervision of the bargaining process.
More important, most treatments of postcontractual opportunism have
suggested that asset specificity does not reach legally important levels
in the precontractual stage of business relations. 7 The remainder of
this Part endeavors to prove this assumption incorrect.
B. Negotiation and Opportunism
1. Negotiation: A Complex, Multistage Process that Develops
Business Relationships
Legal doctrines governing contract formation convey a mechanical,
assured image of the negotiation process. Traditional contract law views
negotiation as an orderly procedure consisting of an exchange of offers
and counter-offers followed by an acceptance or rejection. The principle
questions addressed by these doctrines are whether and when a con-
tract has been formed.48 This focus on the exchange of discrete expres-
sions of intent leads to legal preoccupation with such "tantalizing
45. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 43, at 287, 293.
46. See id. at 287; Epstein, supra note 43, at 975-76; Fischel, supra note 4, at 140-41.
47. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Professors Robert Scott and Charles Goetz
have argued that it is desirable for negotiators to take responsibility for their own costs, including
the costs of premature reliance. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 28, at 1293-96. They argue that
bargaining to protect parties from liability for precontractual reliance is more costly than bargain-
ing for a contract to assure that reliance will be compensated. Id. Professor Scott has argued else-
where that parties would rather risk uncompensated reliance losses than liability for another
person's reliance because parties can exercise more control over their own reliance expenditures.
See R. ScoTr & D. LESLM, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 137 (1988). These analyses ignore the possi-
bility that reliance may have significance to the developing relationship between the parties pre-
cisely because it is both costly and unprotected by conventional contract. See Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 375, 378, 429-41, 446-56 (1990) (analyz-
ing legal compensation for precontractual reliance in terms of information and drafting costs); id.
at 379 (concluding that "[1]egal decisionmakers should intervene sparingly, only when the parties'
assessment [of the availablility and effectiveness of nonlegal sanctions] was significantly
mistaken").
48. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.1-3.2, at 106-08 (1982).
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puzzles" as the battle of the forms and the mailbox rule.'9 The result is
legal scholarship that emphasizes situations in which parties engage in
essentially zero-sum, single-issue "positional bargaining.""
Many social scientists51 and a growing number of legal scholars52
view the contract formation process more realistically. Negotiation, far
from being a clock-like mechanism, is seen as a complex commercial
institution that marks the preliminary stage in all business relations.5 3
The typical negotiation process is not a positional tug of war over a
single issue. Instead, negotiation concerns the development of human
relationships, takes considerable time, involves multiple issues, and
often includes many parties. 5' On close examination, even a relatively
49. Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 218.
50. See, e.g., Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 494 n.1
(1989) (stating that "[n]egotiation often involves the use of a mixture of strategies, but because
most use some version of offers and counteroffers, positional bargaining is the paradigm for this
Article"). A number of articles have addressed the particular problems faced by lawyers as negotia-
tors and have puzzled over the problem of lying and deception in routine, essentially zero-sum
bargaining encounters. See, e.g., Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. Ricm. L. REv. 99
(1982); Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1987); Thurman, Chipping
Away at Lawyer Veracity: The ABA's Turn Toward Situation Ethics in Negotiations, 1990 J.
DISPUTE RESOLUTIoN 103; White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Nego-
tiation, A. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 926 (1980).
51. Social psychologists and other social scientists have studied complex bargaining in great
detail. See, e.g., P. GuLLxvzR, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROsS-CULTURAL. PERSPECTIVE (1979);
R LzwIcKI & L. LrrrmuR NEGOTIATION (1985); D. PRUTrr, supra note 14; A. ROTH, G iE-THEo-
RETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1985); J. RUBN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAIN-
ING AND NEGOTIATION (1975); A. STRAUSS, NEGOTIATIONS (1978); R. WALTON & R. McKERsme, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965); 1 ZARTmAN & M. BEMA, THE PRACTICAL
NEGOTIATOR (1982).
52. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HAnv. L. Rev. 637 (1976); Farnsworth, supra note 10; Gifford, A Context-Based
Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 41 (1985); Heymann, supra
note 18; Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behavior, 31 U. KANu.
L. Rev. 69 (1982); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); Stulberg, Negotiation Concepts and Advocacy
Skills: The ADR Challenge, 48 ALB. L. Rev. 719 (1984).
53. J. COMMONS, THE ECONOMICS OF CoLLEcTE ACTION 126 (1970) (asserting that "[a]ll eco-
nomic activity goes through three stages-negotiation, transaction, and administration"); Ring &
Van de Ven, Formal and Informal Dimensions of Transactions, in RESEARCH ON THE MANAGEMENT
OF INNOVATION. THE MINNESOTA STumss 173-74 (A. Van de Ven, H. Angles & M. Poole eds. 1989).
54. As one leading commentator has noted:
Ours is an era of "deals"-for the long-term supply of energy, for the development of a shop-
ping center, for the friendly takeover of a corporation, for the signing of a first-round draft
choice. . . . The terms [of such deals] are reached by negotiations, usually face-to-face over a
considerable period of time and often involving corporate officers, bankers, engineers, ac-
countants, lawyers, and others. . . During the negotiation of such deals there is often no
offer or counter-offer for either party to accept, but rather a gradual process in which agree-
ments are reached piecemeal in several "rounds" with a succession of drafts. There may first
be an exchange of information and an identification of the parties' interests and differences,
then a series of compromises with tentative agreement on major points, and finally a refining
of contract terms.
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simple negotiation, such as a consumer's new car purchase, turns out to
be an elaborate interaction concerning many issues that can make an
agreement difficult to reach.5
Anthropologist P.H. Gulliver's general description of negotiation in
his classic cross-cultural study56 confirms this revisionist characteriza-
tion of commercial negotiation. According to Gulliver, the negotiation
process typically is an extended interaction in which people:
accumulate an experience of each other and of the changing situation in which they
are operating and interacting. They develop an appreciation (not necessarily objec-
tively accurate, of course) of each other, of themselves, and of the apparent potenti-
alities and impossibilities between them. There is likely to be some development of
their immediate relationship as negotiators in terms of ... competitiveness or co-
operation, trust or mistrust, cautiousness or candor, respect or disdain.
57
Business negotiations are no exception to this pattern. Commercial
bargaining encounters are multistage processes in which business peo-
ple test and learn about each other as well as the issues under consider-
ation.58 When skillfully executed, the bargaining exchange enables the
parties to benefit from their experience with each other and helps them
to achieve satisfaction with a particular outcome.5 9
Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 218-19. Indeed, there even appears to be a distinct "prenegotiation"
phase to complex transactions in which the parties discuss whether and how they will negotiate.
See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp., Wall St. J., July 13, 1990, at B2, col. 6 (reporting that
"Occidental Petroleum said that its Occidental Chemical Corp. unit has held discussions on the
[possible acquisition of European Vinyls Corp.] but that these talks haven't reached the level of
negotiations"). Economists have termed this prenegotiation process the "cheap talk" phase. See,
e.g., Crawford & Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50 EcONOlMTRICA 1431 (1982); Far-
rell & Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 221 (1989).
55. See, e.g., How to Drive a Hard Bargain in a Soft Market, CONSUMER REP. 213 (1990).
The article reports that "n]ew car sales are down and aggressive advertising is up. But sluggish
auto sales don't necessarily make it easier to negotiate a good deal on a new car. In fact, rebates,
low-interest financing, and other incentives can create considerable confusion about the actual
price." Id.
56. P. GULLIVER, supra note 51.
57. Id. at 73. In studying negotiation, Gulliver found that a common pattern emerged to
accomplish these complex goals. Negotiation consists of eight distinct stages: (1) the search for a
negotiating arena; (2) the formulation of an agenda; (3) preliminary exchanges of information, po-
sitions, and interests; (4) narrowing and selection of primary issues, including occasional tentative
agreements on secondary issues; (5) preparation for final bargaining; (6) final bargaining; (7).ritual
confirmation of the final terms of the agreement; and (8) implementation. Id. at 82. Gulliver did
not maintain that each stage was present in every negotiation. He also acknowledged that certain
stages might be combined or taken out of order. Id.
58. See Hamner, Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a
Stalemated Negotiation, 30 J. PERsoNALrry & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 458, 465 (1974). The article notes
that "negotiators expect something more than just a mutually rewarding payoff. They also seem to
expect a rewarding social exchange, trial by trial." Id.
59. P. GULLIVER, supra note 51, at 177. Courts sometimes recognize that parties form rela-
tionships based on bargaining interactions and that these relationships change as negotiations pro-
gress. See, e.g., Opdyke Inv. Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 413 Mich. 354, 320 N.W.2d 836 (1982)
(holding that an agreement to agree in the second letter of intent might be binding because the
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2. Investment of Transaction-Specific Resources During Negotiation
If one contemplates negotiation as a time-consuming exchange in
which people test their relationship at the same time they discuss their
deal, the possibility emerges that parties might commit resources to a
proposed transaction before forming a contract under traditional con-
tract law. In essence, parties use the negotiation process to express who
they are-or who they want the other side to think they are-and to
learn about the other side's disposition and character.6 0 The bargaining
process will reflect each side's "style,"61 expectations about general
norms of business conduct, and views about how transactions are exe-
cuted most effectively. If the deal contemplates further interaction be-
tween the parties in the postcontractual period, parties may seek to
portray in their bargaining behavior the type of long-term, cooperative
relationship they seek in the postcontractual period.
In a world in which bargainers seek information about each other
as well as the specific terms of a deal, the commitment of transaction-
specific resources before contract formation may illuminate the inves-
tor's character and the type of commercial relationship being sought.
Like transaction-specific investments made in the postcontractual pe-
riod, however, precontractual investments expose the investor to oppor-
tunistic exploitation by the other side.
2
Case law confirms both the range of precontractual investments
that commercial parties actually make and the judicial concern over the
exploitation of these investments. Indeed, the very range of judicial
tools employed to remedy what is essentially one recurring fact pattern
illustrates judicial sensitivity to bargaining opportunism.3
parties no longer were strangers and were working toward a common goal).
60. Even if the deal is a discrete event, the precontractual bargaining is part of a personal
behavioral continuum for both parties. Economist Robert Frank has argued that some people
strive for consistency in their economic behavior, even in situations that promise no ongoing rela-
tionship. See R. FRANK, supra note 16, at 18. He gives the example of people tipping in restaurants
in cities far from their homes. Frank explains that this behavior is a form of emotional commit-
ment to fairness and good faith that makes it easier for people to communicate these traits credi-
bly to other people in situations in which repeat dealings are likely. Id. at 16-19.
61. Professor Gerald Williams has conducted empirical research into personal negotiation
styles. He has concluded that, at least among his sample of lawyer-negotiators, a majority of nego-
tiators exhibited a "cooperative" as opposed to a "competitive" style. G. WiLLIAmS, LEGAL NEGOTi-
ATION AND SsvmasrI NT 15-46 (1983). The cooperative approach was characterized by ethical
principles of dealing and a commitment to fairness. Id. at 20.
62. Indeed, some business commentators define negotiation in terms of the danger of oppor-
tunistic exploitation. See D. LAx & J. SxERNius, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR 11 (1986) (defining
negotiation as "a process of potentially opportunistic interaction in which two or more parties,
with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could do
otherwise").
63. I am indebted to Professor Allan Farnsworth for his comprehensive doctrinal article on
precontractual liability for many of the cases discussed in this Part. See Farnsworth, supra note
1991]
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a. Precontractual Disclosure of Proprietary Information
One way in which parties make transaction-specific investments
during the bargaining process is through the disclosure of valuable pro-
prietary information. When the parties are bargaining precisely over
the value of proprietary information, the owner of the information is
under pressure to disclose it. By acquiescing, however, the disclosing
party risks exploitation. The other side may act opportunistically, tak-
ing what it needs from the information and refusing to conclude the
transaction.
The most obvious cure for the problem of precontractual disclosure
of proprietary information is contract law. Sellers may require buyers to
sign an express precontractual agreement to keep the information se-
cret. This solution, however, sometimes is unsatisfactory in practice.
Time constraints, mutual preferences for low preliminary bargaining
costs, and pressures arising from a buyer's market may prevent sellers
from demanding a precontractual confidentiality agreement.6 4 In addi-
tion, some sellers, particularly amateur inventors, do not enter the mar-
ket frequently. Thus, they are unsophisticated in the business world."5
In the absence of an express contract protecting disclosure, parties
must rely on an action in tort for misappropriation of trade secrets. In
applying the doctrine of misappropriation, courts have revealed their
underlying concern for opportunistic bargaining. In many jurisdictions,
one of the core allegations of a misappropriation claim is that the dis-
closure occurred within the context of a "confidential relationship."'6
10, at 221-43. The range of doctrinal tools used by courts to deter bargaining misbehavior has been
commented on by other scholars as well. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 1-4; Levmore, Strategic
Delays and Fiduciary Duties, 74 VA. L. Rv. 863, 905 n.123 (1988).
64. One situation that routinely calls for precontractual disclosure of proprietary information
is the purchase and sale of a small business. Because a buyer's market now exists, see Selz &
Robichaux, Small Firms, Like Homes, Fetch Less, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1990, at B1, col. 6, sellers
may not be in a position to demand precontractual confidentiality guarantees. See Jefferson, How
a Failed Merger Spouted Trouble for a Faucet Firm, Wall St. J., July 18, 1990, at B2, col. 3. The
article reports on allegations by a small faucet firm that a large prospective buyer entered into
merger negotiations, stole trade secrets, and then tried to drive the small firm out of business. The
article states that "the courts are filled with lawsuits by entrepreneurs who allege that a potential
buyer stole their secrets and roughed them up in other ways." Id.
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the inventor was an amateur who never indicated that he intended to have a commercial relation.
ship with the tool company); Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631, 632 (2d Cir.
1946) (remarking that the inventor was a longshoreman).
66. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (holding
that the existence of a confidential relationship is the "starting point" of the analysis in trade
secrets cases); Wiesner & Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REv. 1076, 1078
(1988). A confidential relationship is required because free disclosure of trade secrets compromises
their essential character as secrets. When the secret is disclosed in the context of a "confidential
relationship," such as that between partners, joint venturers, or employers and employees, how-
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Parties negotiating the sale of a business or proprietary information,
however, often bargain at arm's length. Far from having a confidential
relationship, each side is furthering its own interests. Thus, disclosure
of information in this context threatens its status as a secret.1
7
Courts could apply the confidential relationship requirement
strictly and rule that sellers who do not contract for protection before
disclosure can obtain no relief.6 8 Instead, courts have held that even an
arm's length bargaining relationship becomes a relationship of confi-
dence once the buyer accepts proprietary information from the seller in
the course of negotiations. In the classic case of Smith v. Dravo Corp.,9
for example, a potential buyer of a shipbuilding company requested and
reviewed patent applications, blueprints, and other information regard-
ing the seller's principal asset-the first uniform freight containers
designed for use on ship and rail. After receiving this information, the
buyer rejected all the seller's offers, broke off negotiations, and an-
nounced plans to design and produce its own uniform shipping
container. The buyer's design differed just enough from the seller's
container to avoid patent infringement.7 0 In ruling for the seller on its
ever, disclosure does not destroy the claim. Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 463 (1st
Cir. 1985); R MLGRIM, 1 TRAnE SECRETS § 4.03, at 4-17 (1990). Some courts treat trade secret
misappropriation as a form of conversion, viewing misappropriation simply as a wrongful taking of
someone's "property." Note, All the King's Horses-Irreparable Harm in Trade Secret Litigation,
52 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 804, 809-15 (1984).
67. Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 230 (arguing that arm's length negotiations "cannot be
characterized as 'confidential' for this purpose"). Farnsworth appears to be wrong in concluding
that the courts refuse to recognize arm's length negotiations as occasions for implying confidential
relationships. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Farnsworth cites only one lower court
case from California to support his conclusion. See Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1979). In Faris the plaintiff was a television producer with an idea for a new game show.
He revealed his idea to a prospective game show host in an effort to recruit him as an employee.
The host then mentioned the idea to others. The idea itself never was negotiated between the
plaintiff and defendant. The court found no evidence of an implied contract to sell the idea to
anyone, much less to the game show host. Id. at 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 704. When the negotiations
concern the sale of an idea, the California courts recognize an implied confidential relationship
between the buyer and seller. See Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, 245 Cal. App. 2d 593, 54
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966); Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469, 310 P.2d 436
(1957).
68. Courts have refused to find confidential relationships in arm's length bargaining en-
counters in the context of securities regulation. In Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796
(2d Cir. 1980), the target of a friendly merger bid shared proprietary, nonpublic company informa-
tion with the potential bidder's investment advisor. The advisor then used the inside information
to make trades in the target's stock. The target's shareholders sued the advisor, claiming that a
relationship of confidence or fiduciary duty existed between the advisor and the target company by
virtue of the information disclosure. The court held that in the absence of any explicit confidenti-
ality contract the disclosures did not create any obligation on the part of the advisor to keep the
information confidential. Absent such a duty, there was no compensable "insider trading." Id. at
799.
69. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
70. As it turned out, the new container rendered the seller's containers "obsolete." Id. at 372.
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claim of trade secret misappropriation, the court acknowledged that the
defendant provided no express promise to keep the plaintiff's informa-
tion secret 71 and that the parties were bargaining at arm's length.72
Nevertheless, the court found a confidential relationship based on the
trust that the plaintiff reposed in the buyer. 3
The potential for implying confidential relationships in conven-
tional bargaining exchanges has created a new avenue for opportunism
in the market for inventions such as tools, gadgets, and games. Oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs have been known to flood firms buying these inven-
tions with unsolicited, vaguely worded descriptions of new concepts,
hoping that a new product eventually developed by the company will
give them the basis for a misappropriation claim. 4 Many large compa-
nies protect themselves from these claims by using standard form waiv-
ers.7" These waivers essentially state: "No confidential relationship is to
be established by such submission or implied from consideration of the
71. Id. at 376.
72. Id.
73. Id. Other courts similarly have held that unrelated parties bargaining at arm's length are
in a confidential relationship with respect to disclosed trade secret information. See, e.g., Heyman
v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that "whatever conduct courts
should countenance when parties bargain at arm's length, we think parties should be expected to
comply with these essentials of fair dealing"); Speedry Chem. Prods. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d
328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1962); Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir.
1946); Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
673 (1936); Biodynamic Technologies, Inc. v. Chattanooga Corp., 644 F. Supp. 607, 611 (S.D. Fla.
1986). When it is not proven that the parties actually were engaged in negotiations, courts have
been reluctant to find a confidential relationship. See, e.g., Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d at 580-
81 (noting that ratchet inventor never explicitly asked for compensation for his invention or indi-
cated in any way that he desired a commercial relationship with the company to which he gave the
design); RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 118, 267 N.W.2d 226, 232 (1978) (company
disclosed trade secrets in context of price solicitation that did not include an offer of a contractual
relationship).
74. See Matarese, 158 F.2d at 634. The Matarese court remarked:
Courts have justly been assiduous in defeating attempts to delve into pockets of business
firms through spurious claims for compensation for the use of ideas. Thus to be rejected are
attempts made by telephoning or writing vague ideas to business corporations and then seiz-
ing upon some later general similarity between their products and the notions propounded as
a basis for damages.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Burten, 763 F.2d at 467 (stating, "we fully recognize that a manufacturer may
wish to insulate itself from claims of misuse of materials submitted in confidence, whether founded
on fact, fantasy or coincidence"); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 884, 889 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); Zaidan v. Borg-Warner Corp., 228 F. Supp. 669, 670-71 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afl'd, 341
F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965); Van Rensselaer v. General Motors Corp., 223 F. Supp. 323, 331 (E.D.
Mich. 1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1963); Boop v. Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 522, 529




submitted material."76 Courts have upheld the validity of these waivers
to terminate the inventor's right to sue for misappropriation.
7 7
Judicial recognition of confidentiality waivers, however, presents
yet a third possibility for opportunism: Companies could use the waiv-
ers to steal legitimate ideas from bona fide inventors. Concern for this
possibility has led courts to construe confidentiality waivers strictly.78
b. Commitment of Assets Toward Performance
Many commercial negotiations concern deals in which performance
will be lengthy and complicated. As parties become confident of striking
a final agreement, one side may begin making investments in perform-
ance. The incentives supporting precontractual commitment of assets
vary, but these investments often are in the parties' mutual interests.
For example, time may be of the essence in deals that require coordi-
nated action between many parties. Second, opportunities to obtain
cheap resources needed for performance may present themselves during
negotiations. Third, the parties may want to test each other by coordi-
nating a relatively minor aspect of performance before concluding the
final contract. Finally, third parties may exert pressure on the negotia-
tors to begin performance even though important terms of the contract
remain open.
Investments in transaction-specific assets set the stage for opportu-
nistic behavior by the party less committed to the deal. Blatant oppor-
tunism occurs when the less-committed party simply exploits the part
performance and breaks off negotiations. Opportunism also can take
subtle forms. For example, to maintain attractive options, one side
might encourage precontractual performance by the other side, while
76. Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749, 754 (N.D. IlM. 1971).
77. See Burten, 763 F.2d at 464 (and cases cited therein); R. MILGRIM, supra note 66, § 4.03,
at 4-26 (agreeing that an express disclaimer of a confidential relationship from the outset "will
dispel the existence of such a relationship").
78. See Burten, 763 F.2d at 461. In Burten the waiver stated that the inventor's submission
"does not, in whole or in part, establish or create by implication or otherwise any relationship
between Company and me not expressed herein." Id. at 464 n.3. The court held that this clause
was ineffective because other disclaimer clauses in the game industry explicitly mention the word
"confidence" or "confidential" in contrast to Milton Bradley's broad disclaimer of "any relation-
ship." Id. at 465. Moreover, viewing the contract as a whole, the court found that the parties
intended something more than patent rights to survive the signing of the disclosure form. Id. at
465-66. The court stated:
Massachusetts encourages the protection of trade secrets not only because the public has
a manifest interest in commercial innovation and development, but because it has an interest
in the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics. Fundamental to this, we believe, is the
expectation by the parties that, absent an explicit waiver, the exchange of ideas will take




engaging in undisclosed parallel negotiations or business planning activ-
ities with third parties. The performing party thus invests transaction-
specific assets that expose it to possible exploitation, while the opportu-
nistic party enhances its alternatives at little cost. Opportunists also
can attempt to use the deepening commitment by the other side to
practice "the nibble"-using the other side's disproportionate commit-
ment as leverage to make one last substantial set of demands in the
final stage of bargaining.
7 9
The case law on precontractual commitment of performance-re-
lated resources reveals the range of doctrinal tools that the courts use
to compensate victims of precontractual opportunistic behavior. The
following subsections survey these doctrines.
i. Promissory Estoppel
Claims for promissory estoppel arise when one party makes a
promise upon which another reasonably relies to its detriment.80 Profes-
sors Randy Barnett and Mary Becker point out that there are two types
of promissory estoppel cases: Those in which the doctrine serves as a
substitute for contract law and those involving promissory misrepresen-
tations made during negotiation." This Article addresses only the
promissory misrepresentation cases. The reliance element in these cases
signals the existence of performance-related investments that have been
exploited by the nonperforming party. Two examples illustrate how
courts have used promissory estoppel to compensate victims of bargain-
ing opportunism.
In Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp.82 a company in the preliminary
stage of negotiating the sale of all its assets disclosed information re-
garding one of its most valuable assets-its right to negotiate with a
third party to obtain a valuable license. After signing a nonbinding let-
ter of intent but before a final agreement was executed, the prospective
79. Negotiation guru Herb Cohen has illustrated "the nibble" tactic by recounting a story of
someone negotiating a free tie from a clothing salesperson. If the salesperson works on commission,
his time is quite valuable. A customer can practice "the nibble" by trying on many different suits
and generally interfering with the salesperson's ability to wait on other customers. The salesperson
will become extremely committed to closing the particular sale with the customer. Then, as the
salesperson is writing up the sales slip, the customer demands a free tie. The salesperson is suppos-
edly so glad to get rid of Mr. Cohen's friend that he happily agrees. H. CoHEN, You CAN N, GOTIATE
ANYTIUNG 37-39 (1980). Cohen admits that he does not shop this way.
80. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981); E. FARNSwoRTH, supra note 48, §
2.19; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 10, at 474 n.2.
81. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 10, at 446 (remarking that in some cases promissory
estoppel permits courts to enforce promises that are intended to be legally binding but fail to
satisfy some technical requirement of contract law, while in other cases promissory estoppel serves
to punish misrepresentation).
82. 813 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1987).
240 [Vol. 44:221
1991] TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS
seller permitted the buyer to take over negotiation for the license. With
the seller's advice, the buyer acquired the license, but then refused to
go forward with the purchase of assets. Although the parties focused on
the question of whether the letter of intent constituted a contract,"8 the
court remanded the case to determine whether, under promissory es-
toppel, the seller could be compensated for turning over the license
negotiation.
4
A more famous application of promissory estoppel to permit recov-
ery of precontractual investments is Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.5 In
Hoffman a prospective franchisee approached the Red Owl grocery
franchise about starting his own business. Red Owl encouraged Hoff-
man, but required him to make substantial investments as a condition
to receiving an actual offer.86 Hoffman complied initially, but gave up
and sued when the franchisor countered with new, more exacting de-
mands. The court ruled in favor of Hoffman and awarded him his out-
of-pocket expenses.87 Cases factually and analytically similar to Hoff-
man are now regularly litigated under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.8 8
83. The court found that the letter of intent was not a contract. Id. at 814-17.
84. Id. at 817-18.
85. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
86. Hoffman owned a small bakery. In preparation for performance as a Red Owl franchisee,
he took the following steps: (1) sold his bakery at a loss of $2000; (2) bought a small grocery store
to train himself in the grocery business; (3) later sold the grocery store at roughly his cost; (4) put
$1000 down on the land where the Red Owl store would be constructed; and (5) incurred moving
expenses to the town where the franchise would be located. These preparations took roughly three
years, after which the franchisor raised the capital investment required to buy the franchise from
$18,000 to $34,000 and placed more restrictive terms on Hoffman's ability to borrow money from
his father-in-law. Id. at 699-701, 133 N.W.2d at 275-76; see also M. CHmsrFSTrI, CONCMErS AND
CAsE ANiAYSIS IN ThE LAW OF CONTRACTS 51-52 (1990) (discussing the facts of Hoffman).
87. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 696-97, 133 N.W.2d at 274. On remand, Hoffman won a settle-
ment of $10,600 from Red Owl after a day and a half of trial. Hoffman went on to become an
award-winning salesperson for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. KmwELL, MACAULAY, THOME
& WHrTroRD, CoNTRAcrs L THE WISCONSIN CoNTRAcTs MATERIALS, BOOK 2 498-99 (1985) (quoting
conversations between the authors and Hoffman's Wisconsin lawyer). It should be noted that, un-
like the situation in Skycom, the defendant in Hoffman did not benefit directly from the perform-
ing party's commitment of resources to the transaction. Red Owl could not "appropriate"
Hoffman's readiness to be a franchisee. Red Owl, however, could benefit from Hoffman's increased
skills. Hoffman's readiness to perform gave Red Owl better options for distribution in Hoffman's
area at no cost to Red OwL Other courts similarly have recognized promissory estoppel as a basis
for damages when franchisors have strung prospective franchisees along, induced them to make
precontractual expenditures, and then refused to go through with the deal. See, e.g., Cincinnati
Fluid Power, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc., 797 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir. 1986) (remanding for new trial based on
erroneous jury instruction); Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984); Walters v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958).
88. See, e.g., Nimrod Mktg. (Overseas) v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding that a purchasing agent who acquired equipment and materials for a Nigerian
housing project could recover precontractual performance expenses based on promissory estoppel
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ii. Unjust Enrichment
When one party's partial performance during negotiation actually
'confers a benefit on the other, the equitable doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment can provide an alternative theory of recovery for the victim of
opportunistic conduct. Damages based on unjust enrichment, however,
sometimes do not compensate the performing party for the full value of
its services because, as Hoffman demonstrates, not all preparations for
performance directly benefit the other side. Nevertheless, the courts
have defined "enrichment" broadly enough to overcome this problem in
precontractual opportunism cases.
In Earhart v. William Low Co.,89 for example, a landowner and a
contractor made an agreement for the construction of a trailer park,
subject to financing. Before obtaining financing, the landowner asked
the contractor to begin clearing two parcels of land. The landowner al-
ready owned one of the parcels and was to obtain the second with his
new financing. The owner could not arrange financing for the two-par-
cel deal, but later obtained financing for a smaller project involving
only his own parcel. He went forward with the development, but he
refused to pay for the first contractor's clearing work and used another
when the owners backed out because of their failure to conclude a primary contract with Nigerian
joint venturers), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983)
(finding relief under promissory estoppel for a prospective small business partner who quit his job,
mortgaged his home, and moved to the location of a new business only to be asked at the last
minute to become an employee instead of co-owner); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975) (awarding two month's lost wages to employee who quit her job in reliance on a prom-
ise of new employment but was refused a job); Elgin Nat'l Indus. v. Howard Indus., 264 So. 2d 440
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (applying promissory estoppel to real estate transaction after buyer
spent funds to apply for mortgage and began engineering studies for the move with the seller's
knowledge and approval, who then sold the land to another for a higher price); Wheeler v. White,
398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965) (finding that a borrower who demolished a building and cleared land for
construction of a new building was entitled to relief on the basis of promissory estoppel when
lender that requested these actions refused to go through with the loan). An analogous set of cases
has granted relief when, rather than making contract-specific investments, the plaintiff foregoes
advantageous opportunities based on assurances that the negotiation process will result in a final
deal. Forbearance constitutes a commitment to the negotiation process no less than actual expend-
itures of money. See, e.g., Greenstein v. Flately, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985)
(finding a commercial landlord liable under promissory estoppel and state FTC Act for relocation
expenses and extra rent after drawing out negotiations with an existing commercial tenant then
closing a deal with another tenant); Ned Nastrom Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co.,
338 N.W.2d 64 (N.D. 1983) (awarding damages based on promissory estoppel when creditor did
not file lawsuit or institute bankruptcy proceedings because of assurances that settlement of debt
would be worked out agreeably). One commentator has suggested that courts utilize the tort of
negligent misrepresentation to address situations like that in Hoffman. See Gergen, supra note 10,
at 34-46. He cites one case that has found liability in a Hoffman-like situation using this theory.
See Giant Food v. Ice King, 74 Md. App. 183, 192-94, 536 A.2d 1182, 1186-87, cert. denied, 313
Md. 7, 542 A.2d 844 (1988).
89. 25 Cal. 3d 503, 600 P.2d 1344, 158 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1979); see also Farnsworth, supra note
10, at 223-24.
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contractor to complete the project. The first contractor sued for the
work performed on both tracts, claiming unjust enrichment. The trial
court narrowly defined "enrichment" and awarded compensation only
for the work on the owner's property because the work on the adjacent
land did not directly benefit the owner. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, however, ruled that the contractor was entitled to compensation for
work on both tracts, stating that "a defendant who receives the satisfac-
tion of obtaining another person's compliance with the defendant's re-
quest to perform services incurs an obligation to pay for labor and
materials expended in reliance on that request."90 This reformulation of
the elements of unjust enrichment greatly enlarges the scope of the
claim. This broader definition also demonstrates the lengths to which
courts will go to compensate fully victims of opportunism who have
committed contract-specific assets during the negotiation process.9 1
iii. Breach of Agreement to Negotiate in Good Faith
A recent judicial innovation in cases focusing on the precontractual
period is the recognition of express or implied promises to bargain in
good faith.92 Under traditional contract jurisprudence, "agreements to
agree" are too indefinite to be enforced. A judicial sensitivity to the
dangers of opportunism in the negotiation process, however, has loos-
ened the judicial attitude toward indefinite agreements, resulting in
judgments against parties who refuse to honor agreements to negotiate
after inducing others to make expenditures.
A leading case is Channel Home Centers v. Grossman.e" In Chan-
nel Home Centers a shopping mall developer and a prospective tenant
signed a letter of intent that specified the general framework on which
90. Earhart, 25 Cal. 3d at 510, 600 P.2d at 1345, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
91. See Precision Testing Laboratory v. Kenyon Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1327, 1350-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (awarding damages for unjust enrichment based on services performed by a potential joint
venture partner while the agreement was being negotiated).
92. Although judicial recognition of contracts to bargain in good faith is recent, legal scholars
have explored the problem for decades. See Dugdale & Lowe, Contracts to Contract and Contracts
to Negotiate, 1976 J. Bus. L. 28; Farnsworth, supra note 10; Holmes, The Freedom Not to Con-
tract, 60 TuL. L. REv. 751 (1986); Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673
(1969). This duty is already part of American labor law by statute. See Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); R. GORMAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 399-495 (1976); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 H.ARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958).
93. See, e.g., John Bleakley Ford, Inc. v. Estes, 164 Ga. App. 547, 298 S.E.2d 270 (1982)
(refusing to enforce because of indefiniteness an oral promise that landlord would enter into a new
lease agreement with car dealership); Yan's Video, Inc. v. Hong Kong TV Video Programs, 133
A.D.2d 575, 520 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1987) (refusing to enforce a statement in a licensing agreement that
the licensor will negotiate in good faith to renew agreements for an additional year on terms to be
negotiated).
94. 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
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the parties would negotiate specific lease terms. The developer used the
tentative agreement to get financing for the project. The letter pro-
vided, somewhat cryptically, that upon signing the landlord would
"withdraw the Store from the rental market, and only negotiate the
above described leasing transaction to completion. ' 95 Pursuant to this
preliminary agreement, the tenant spent approximately twenty-five
thousand dollars preparing to occupy the space. Before the lease was
finalized or signed, the landlord reneged and accepted another tenant
willing to pay higher rent. The original tenant filed suit. The court held
that the promise to "negotiate" in the letter of intent was binding and
was breached when the landlord backed out of the deal. This breach
entitled the prospective tenant to recover the twenty-five thousand dol-
lars spent on preparation. 8
Channel Home Centers was premised on the breach of an express
contract to bargain in good faith. Other courts have recognized
promises to bargain in good faith based on promissory estoppel. In Ar-
cadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp.97 the Second Circuit pointed
to a promise "to cooperate" in a letter of intent as a possible basis of a
promissory estoppel claim for precontractual expenses. Arcadian Corp.
entered into negotiations to sell its fertilizer business to a joint venture
group called Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. (API).9 9 The parties executed a
preliminary agreement specifying the sale price, the assets for sale, and
the closing date. The agreement further specified that the parties would
"cooperate fully and work judiciously in order to expedite the closing
date and consummate the sale of the business."99 During the negotia-
tion process, however, the price of phosphates rose dramatically, and
Arcadian Corp. reneged on its prior agreement to take only five percent
equity in the new joint venture. In light of the new market conditions,
Arcadian Corp. demanded a majority stake in the venture. 100 API sued
to enforce the preliminary agreement as an actual contract. The court
found that the preliminary agreement did not amount to a contract to
sell the company. The court did hold, however, that API could make a
promissory estoppel claim for losses incurred during the precontractual
95. Id. at 293.
96. Id. at 300; see also Chase v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 744 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1984);
OAO Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 91, 100-02 (1989) (precontractual investments that were
reimbursed were based on an oral, implied-in-fact contract); Waltentas v. Lipper, 636 F. Supp. 331,
335 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 494 N.E.2d
99, 100, 502 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995 (1986).
97. 884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 70.
99. Id. at 70-71.
100. Id. at 71.
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period based on a possible breach of the seller's promise to cooperate
fully in consummating the sale. 1 '
iv. Promissory Fraud
The tort of promissory fraud renders a negotiator liable for making
promises that the negotiator had no intention of keeping at the time
they were made.102 All but two American jurisdictions recognize liability
for fraudulent promises.0 s Strict evidentiary requirements on the in-
tent element would render this claim a legal rarity because the prom-
isor's subjective intent not to keep a promise is difficult to prove
definitively. 10 The courts, however, have not uniformly required strict
proof of intent. Fraudulent intent cannot be inferred solely from non-
performance of the promise,'10 5 but circumstantial evidence, such as
sharp dealing throughout the transaction0 ' or a refusal to acknowledge
that a contract was made,10 7 can establish a prima facie case of promis-
sory fraud.
When victims of opportunistic conduct are induced to make con-
tract-specific investments or to forego unique opportunities during the
negotiation process, promissory fraud sometimes has furnished relief.
Unlike the previously mentioned theories of recovery, the victims of op-
portunism in promissory fraud cases often are induced to enter into a
contract before evidence of the defendant's precontractual opportunism
surfaces. In many promissory fraud cases, however, precontractual com-
mitment of resources to performance constitutes a major source of
damages.
In the typical promissory fraud case, an employer, aware that it has
no definite hiring needs, promises a prospective employee long-term
employment. After the employee quits her existing job and moves to
new a location, the employer denies employment altogether or fires the
employee after only a short period of work. 08 Other examples of prom-
101. Id. at 73-74.
102. W. K TON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEaTON ON TORTS § 109, at
762-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEaTON]; Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across
the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47, 58-65 (1986).
103. PROSSER & KFETON, supra note 102, § 109, at 763 (noting that only Indiana and Illinois
reject the doctrine).
104. Hodges v. Pittman, 530 So. 2d 817, 819 (Ala. 1988) (stating that "subjective intent [not
to keep a promise] can rarely, if ever, be conclusively proven").
105. Id. at 818; Britt v. Britt, 320 N.C. 573, 579, 359 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1987).
106. Hanover Modular Homes v. Scottish Inns, 443 F. Supp. 888, 891-92 (W.D. La. 1978);
Breier v. Koncen Meat Co., 762 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
107. New Process Steel Corp. v. Steel Corp., 703 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
108. See, e.g., Hamlen v. Fairchild Indus., 413 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Annota-
tion, Employer's Misrepresentation As to Prospect, or Duration, of Employment As Actionable
Fraud, 24 A.L.R.3D 1412, § 5 (1969). Some courts hold that as a matter of law employees at will
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issory fraud include cases in which franchisors induce prospective fran-
chisees to make downpayments and expend resources in preparation for
performance at a time when the franchisor is bankrupt '09 or has plans
to abandon the geographical area in which the franchise is to be
located.110
Gadsden Paper & Supply Co. v. Washburn' represents an inter-
esting example of the opportunistic scheme captured by promissory
fraud. Gadsden Paper, a business supply company, entered into negoti-
ations to buy Mr. Washburn's sole proprietorship, Gadsden Solvent and
Supply Corp. Gadsden Paper historically had expanded its business by
acquiring smaller companies and absorbing their employees.1 2 Instead
of simply buying Washburn's business for the agreed purchase price of
seventy-two thousand dollars, Gadsden Paper insisted that Washburn
sign an employment agreement that provided for payment of seventy-
two thousand dollars over a two-year period in the form of commissions
from sales generated by Washburn as a Gadsden Paper employee.
Under the agreement, if Washburn's sales generated more than sev-
enty-two thousand dollars in commissions during this period, he would
receive the total amount earned. In no event, however, could he receive
less than seventy-two thousand dollars. Washburn signed the employ-
ment agreement, became a Gadsden Paper employee, sold his inventory
to Gadsden Paper at cost, introduced Gadsden Paper employees to his
existing customers, and began sharing accounts with Gadsden Paper
salespeople. 1 3 Shortly thereafter, Gadsden Paper fired Washburn and
refused to pay the seventy-two thousand dollars, claiming that Wash-
burn was terminable at will under the employment agreement. The
court agreed that Gadsden Paper had not breached the employment
contract, but upheld a promissory fraud award of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars, which included punitive damages. The court found
that Gadsden Paper "set up" Washburn in a scheme essentially to steal
his business.
114
have no claim based on promissory fraud. See Lanham v. Mr. B's Oil Co., 166 Ga. App. 372, 304
S.E.2d 738 (1983); Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 569, 208 S.E.2d 583 (1974).
109. See Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. See Alexander v. Texaco, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mont. 1981).
111. 554 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 1989).
112. Id. at 987.
113. Id. at 985-86.
114. Id. at 987. Another good example of opportunistic bargaining conduct litigated under
the tort theory of promissory fraud is Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Co., 76 Wash. 2d 388,
457 P.2d 535 (1969). In Markov a commercial tenant entered into negotiations with its landlord to
renew its lease on a warehouse and railroad yard. The warehouse was vital to the tenant's contin-
ued business relationship with its main client, the Scott Paper Company, which used the ware-
house as a regional product distribution facility. Representatives from the tenant, the landlord,
and Scott attended the renewal negotiations. Scott's contract with the tenant also was up for re-
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c. Commitments to Third Parties
The negotiation of complex transactions often occurs in the context
of concurrent negotiations between the principal bargainers and others
whose cooperation is needed to execute the final project. Complex con-
struction projects, for example, often require parallel negotiations
among various combinations of architects, owners, contractors, subcon-
tractors, and lenders. The timing of the commitments to these contracts
sometimes creates the danger of precontractual opportunism. The dan-
ger grows as parties become unevenly committed to the transaction by
virtue of their need to create transaction-specific contracts with third
parties. Similarly, when a commodity buyer intends to resell and pre-
maturely commits to a secondary transaction based on the seller's as-
surances, the buyer will find itself in a vulnerable position if the seller
then seeks to renegotiate the terms of the deal.
Textbook examples of judicial responses to the problem of uneven
commitments to third parties can be found in James Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Bros.115 and Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 116 In Gimbel the Penn-
sylvania Department of Highways invited bids on the construction of a
public building. Gimbel, a linoleum supplier, obtained specifications for
the linoleum necessary for the job. Gimbel then sent out fixed-price of-
fers to supply linoleum to thirty prime contractors expected to bid on
the project. Baird received one of these offers and used it in preparing
its bid.117 After Baird submitted its bid, Gimbel notified Baird that it
had made a mistake and that the job actually would require twice the
newal and depended on the tenant having a long-term lease. The landlord assured all parties as-
sembled that the tenant's lease would be renewed for a three-year term. Consequently, neither the
tenant nor Scott took any further steps to seek another suitable location. Unbeknownst to the
tenant and Scott, however, the landlord secretly was negotiating to sell the subject property to the
Boeing Company. The lease negotiations were merely a secondary option for the landlord. The sale
to Boeing went through. As a result, the tenant lost the Scott Paper contract and incurred ex-
traordinary expenses in relocating. The court found that the landlord's promise regarding the lease
renewal was fraudulent. It awarded damages for the tenant's lost profits from the Scott Paper
contract and required the defendant to pay the tenant's moving expenses to a new location. Id. at
388, 457 P.2d at 535; see also Ealing Corp. v. Harrods Ltd., 790 F.2d 978, 979 (1st Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff claimed that defendant induced it to spend money on a "pilot program" to distribute
defendant's catalogue in the United States during negotiations for a long-term distribution con-
tract when defendant never intended to enter a long-term contract).
115. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.).
116. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (Traynor, J.).
117. Gimbel, 64 F.2d at 345. In general, prime contractors are bound by their bids once they
are submitted unless the bid is revokable or contains a mistake that excuses performance. E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 48, § 9.4, at 664. Some project owners require prime contractors to sub-
mit "bid bonds" to secure the contractor's performance at the stated price should that contractor's
bid be chosen. Comment, The Sub-Contractor's Bid: An Option Contract Arising Through Prom-
issory Estoppel, 34 EMORY L.J. 421, 428 n.14 (1985).
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estimated amount of linoleum."" Gimbel withdrew its bid and at-
tempted to substitute a corrected offer. Baird, which subsequently was
awarded the contract, sued to hold Gimbel to its original bid. Using
'standard offer-and-acceptance contract theory, Judge Learned Hand re-
fused to bind Gimbel to its bid. He held that withdrawal was permitted
because no contract had been formed at the time Gimbel withdrew its
offer.
119
Gimbel's approach toward the subcontractor-contractor relation-
ship has been rejected by most modern courts.1 20 The revisionist view is
exemplified by Justice Roger Traynor's opinion in Star Paving, which
held that a subcontractor's bid is binding under promissory estoppel
until the prime contractor has had a chance to accept the subcontrac-
tor's bid after being awarded the general contract.'21 This result, said
Justice Traynor, "is only fair.
122
The seemingly conflicting results in Gimbel and Star Paving can be
reconciled through an examination of the cases with an eye to the po-
tential for opportunism in the construction bidding process. The facts
in the two cases differ in a way that has not caught the attention of
most commentators. In Gimbel the subcontractor discovered and com-
municated its mistake to all thirty bidding contractors before anyone
118. Gimbel, 64 F.2d at 345.
119. Id. at 346.
120. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981) (stating that an offer that is
reasonably expected to induce reliance or forbearance of a substantial character before acceptance
and that actually causes reliance "is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid
injustice"); Feinman, supra note 10, at 693 n.72 (and cases cited therein); Comment, supra note
117, at 435.
121. Star Paving, 51 Cal. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760.
122. Id. Courts have required subcontractors to honor their original bids even when the
prime contractor consents to a subcontractor's demand for renegotiation after the main contract
has been awarded. See Montgomery Indus. Int'l v. Thomas Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that consent was void because it was obtained under duress). The Star Paving ruling opens the
door to another form of opportunism, this time by the prime contractor. After Star Paving, the
prime contractor knows that the subcontractor is bound to perform at a stated price once the bid
is submitted. Upon being awarded the contract, the prime contractor may attempt to solicit still
lower bids from other subcontractors. This practice is known as "bid shopping" in the construction
industry. Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, 291 Minn. 113, 121, 190 N.W.2d
71, 76 (1971). The contractor also may try to negotiate with the original subcontractor to reduce
the subcontractor's bid. This practice is known as "bid chopping" or "bid chiseling." Id.; Com-
ment, Construction Bidding Problems: Is There a Solution Fair to Both the General Contractor
and the Subcontractor?, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 552, 563-66 (1975). Justice Traynor perceived and
tried to prevent this danger by stipulating that the prime contractor is "not free to delay accept-
ance after he has been awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a better price. Nor can
he reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a continuing right to
accept the original offer." Star Paving, 51 Cal. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760. Other courts have
affirmed this reciprocal limiting principle. See, e.g., Preload Technology, Inc. v. A.B. & J. Constr.
Co., 696 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1983); Thomas Constr. Co. v. Kelso Marine, Inc., 639 F.2d 216 (5th
Cir. 1981); R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952).
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was awarded the contract.128 In Star Paving, by contrast, the subcon-
tractor waited until after it learned that its offer was part of the win-
ning bid to announce its desire to renegotiate.
This distinction makes little difference from the prime contractor's
standpoint because, absent a patently obvious mistake, the prime con-
tractor is committed to the deal as soon as its bid is submitted.124 From
the standpoint of deterring opportunistic behavior by subcontractors,
however, both Gimbel and Star Paving reach the correct result. Before
the contract is awarded, the subcontractor maximizes both its and the
prime contractor's chances of getting the work by keeping its bid as low
as possible. The danger of an opportunistic bid withdrawal, therefore, is
minimal assuming there is competition for the subcontract. After the
contract is awarded and the subcontractor knows its bid is part of the
winning package, however, it may feel tempted to raise its price to an
amount just below its closest competition, claiming it had made a "mis-
take." Even a significant error is suspect in these circumstances. Under
this analysis, Judge Hand and Justice Traynor both responded cor-
rectly to the potential for opportunism embedded in the facts presented
to them.
Star Paving and its progeny demonstrate a judicial willingness to
deter opportunism when the coordination of parallel contract negotia-
tions requires uneven commitments. A lesser known example of the
same principle appears in an unusual interpretation of the law of fraud
to cover misstatements by an agent of a principal's reservation price.
Perhaps the most guarded information in commercial negotiation is
each party's reservation price or "bottom line." By misrepresenting
their bottom lines negotiators frequently create false impressions re-
garding the range within which they are able to make a deal. Their aim
is to bluff their opponents into surrendering a large share of the surplus
that is actually available in the transaction. 125 It is an accepted negoti-
ating tactic to exaggerate or obscure the minimum or maximum amount
that a party will accept in order to alter the opponent's estimate of
likely agreement points.12 6 One of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
123. Indeed, Gimbel sent word of its mistake on the same day that Baird submitted its bid.
The notice simply arrived a few hours too late. Gimbel, 64 F.2d at 345.
124. See Comment, supra note 117, at 428 (stating that the prime contractor "is bound (and
probably bonded) to perform for the bid he has submitted").
125. R. FRANK, supra note 16, at 165 (remarking that "reservation prices are often difficult to
discern in practice" and that the "art of bargaining, as most of us eventually learn, is in large part
the art of sending misleading messages about them").
126. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 348 comment d (1981) (stating that principals
and agents are "permitted to misstate without liability in deceit the lowest price at which [they
are] willing to sell, or the highest price at which [they are] willing to buy"). Many commentators
do not even consider misstatements about reservation price to be lies. Rather, they refer to them
1991]
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duct, for example, provides that "estimates of price or value placed on
the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim" are not material facts for purposes of prohibiting
lawyers from making false statements to a third person.12 7 The few
cases that have addressed the issue directly hold that parties and their
agents can make such misrepresentations without fear of legal
sanction. 28
One of the few cases that runs contrary to this line of authority
concerns a buyer who prematurely committed to a resale contract and
fell victim to a seller's opportunistic agent. In Collins v. Philadelphia
Oil Co.' 29 a buyer agreed orally with a seller's agent to pay fifty-five
hundred dollars for an oil and gas lease. The buyer then contracted to
sell the lease to a coal company, which the seller's agent learned before
the final papers were delivered on the original sale. When the buyer
arrived to finalize the lease, the agent falsely announced that the owner
had reconsidered and would not take less than ten thousand five hun-
dred dollars for the lease. To avoid breaching the contract with the coal
company, the buyer paid the new amount. When he later learned that
the agent had lied, however, he sued for fraud.
The court acknowledged that the buyer and seller were engaged in
an arm's length transaction in which the buyer received what he paid
for with "his eyes open."'130 Nevertheless, the court refused to hold that
the agent's false assertion regarding the owner's price was mere
"dealer's talk" and determined that the buyer justifiably could rely on
the misrepresentation. 131 As the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
as "bluffs." See P. EKMAN, TELLING Lms 69-70 (1985) (asserting that "[b]ecause the participants
expect misinformation, not the truth, bargaining ... [does not] meet any definition of lying"); H.
RAiFiA, THE ART AND SCIENCE oF NEGOTIATION 142 (1982) (asserting that most people would not
consider self-serving negotiating stances and exaggerations to be "lying").
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONA CoNDucT Rule 4.1(a) comment (1983).
128. See, e.g., Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no
claim for fraud when an insurance agent falsely represented that the insurance company could pay
no more than $900 to an accident victim). Agents are generally free to make these misrepresenta-
tions as long as they do not violate a duty to their principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
348 comment d.
129. 97 W. Va. 464, 125 S.E. 223 (1924).
130. Id. at 469, 125 S.E. at 225.
131. The court reasoned:
We ... demand a more conscionable morality. It may be true in some cases, as suggested,
that a buyer should be held to the responsibility of knowing that agents are prone to boost
the value of the wares at their disposal. That should always be true to a certain extent, but
positive misrepresentations as to the price set upon them by the owners go quite beyond the
scope of clever salesmanship. We do not consider that the doctrine of caveat emptor either
now or ever has been a complete shield to all sorts of false bargaining.... We are inclined to
hold that, where an agent states that his principal has fixed a certain price, a matter as to
which no one could be more accurately informed than the agent himself, in most cases the
buyer has the right to rely upon that statement.
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and Restatement (Second) of Agency make clear, however, most agents
can lie about their principal's reservation price without being sanc-
tioned."3 2 The only general exception arises when a seller's agent exag-
gerates the seller's price, receives that price, and then secretly pockets
the difference between the inflated price paid and the amount the seller
actually was willing to take.1' s The real vice in Collins was not that the
agent misrepresented the asking price, but that he tried opportunisti-
cally to take advantage of the buyer's premature commitment to a third
party.
III. OPPORTUNISM AND THE DILEMMA OF TRUST
The legal developments described in Part II are not new. Nor have
traditional legal scholars criticized them. Indeed, recognition of doc-
trines such as promissory estoppel and contracts to bargain in good
faith generally have been heralded by most commentators as welcome
alternatives to the rigid legal formalism of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.3 Scholars have pointed out that these doctrines
give courts the flexibility to "do justice" in individual cases and to focus
on the interests of the transacting parties instead of inflexible legal doc-
trines.'35 Various stories have been offered to explain the rise of this
Id.
132. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
133. See Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d 427 (1968) (holding a broker liable as
agent of buyer); Hokanson v. Oatman, 165 Mich. 512, 131 N.W. 111 (1911) (holding broker liable
who lied to both buyer and seller and pocketed $300 out of the $1200 paid for the property);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF AGENCY § 348 comment d (stating that broker is liable for misrepresen-
tation of seller's minimum price if done to serve his own interests in violation of his duties to the
owner).
134. Most traditional legal scholars have approved of doctrines such as promissory estoppel
and express contracts to bargain in good faith on the grounds that these doctrines free courts from
the rigid formalism of traditional contract law and permit courts to keep pace with changing prac-
tices in the marketplace. See, e.g., Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 386 (criticizing courts that take a highly formal approach to promissory
estoppel because such an approach "woodenly directs attention away from considerations of justice
and the extent of reliance, and focuses instead upon relatively inflexible and narrow bargain-ori-
ented rules"); Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 286 (approving contracts to bargain in good faith);
Knapp, supra note 92, at 726-28 (same). Critical legal scholars and contemporary formalists, how-
ever, have criticized these doctrines as being too indeterminate when applied. See, e.g., Feinman,
supra note 10, at 689-90 (asserting that promissory estoppel's indeterminacy "prevents the devel-
opment of clear guidelines for judicial decision"); Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the
U.C.C., and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IowA L. REv. 659, 708-15 (1988) (arguing
that promissory estoppel is too vague and should be replaced by a theory focusing on the actual
agreement between the parties).
135. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 10, at 684-85 (arguing that promissory estoppel is part of
the postclassical approach to contract law that emphasizes the basic interests of contracting par-
ties rather than formalities); Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Con-
quest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1408-09 (1983) (noting that courts sought a flexible doctrinal device
to "do justice" in reliance cases).
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modern focus on contextualism.'5 6
Although scholars have described accurately the "rise and fall" of
formal contract law and the possible socioeconomic explanations for
these trends, 137 they have failed to present a unified framework for dis-
cussing the modern legal treatment of the negotiation phase of commer-
cial transactions. 13 8 The economic concepts of opportunism and
transaction-specific investments offer the needed framework and de-
scribe the conditions under which liability arises, at least with respect
to the foregoing set of precontractual cases.13 9 As demonstrated in Part
II, courts are concerned with the precontractual investment of transac-
tion-specific assets and the opportunistic exploitation of these invest-
ments. This insight prompts the following fundamental question: If
contract law is available to protect investments, why do rational com-
mercial parties risk assets in the precontractual stage? The answer lies
in the social psychology of negotiation and the processes by which peo-
ple build mutually trusting bargaining relationships.
As noted earlier, many social scientists view negotiation as more
than just a process of dickering over explicit terms and conditions of
exchange. 40 Rather, negotiation is a laboratory for the construction of
136. H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 11 (1986) (suggesting that a breakdown of formal
contract doctrine was caused by the infusion of "communitarian" values into law); G. Gi.moRz,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 94-96 (1974) (providing a historical account based on evolution of "wel-
fare state and beyond"); Farber & Matheson, supra note 18, at 904-06 (giving an efficiency justifi-
cation for expanded application of promissory estoppel and arguing that the reliance element
should be dropped in commercial cases); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 10, at 500-08 (giving a
historical account based on rise of big corporations).
137. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RisE AND FALL OF FREEDOm OF CONTRACT (1979).
138. Professor Juliet Kostritsky has attempted to link one legal doctrine governing negotia-
tion with the realities of the bargaining arena. She has argued that promissory estoppel cases can
be explained by the existence of "persuasive barriers to, or explanations for the parties dispensing
with, explicitly reciprocal or formalized contracting" and "a plausible benefit to the promisor
[that] can be identified." Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under
the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 895, 905-06
(1987). This theory is both too limited, in that it addresses only the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel, and too broad, in that it attempts to incorporate cases in which promises substitute for consid-
eration and cases that deal with bargaining malfeasance. The concept of bargaining opportunism
captures greater doctrinal variety within the confines of a more specific commercial activity. To
her credit, Professor Kostritsky identifies "trust and confidence relations" as one occasion in which
parties relax their reliance on bargaining formalities. Id. at 905 n.28, 927-29, 937-38. She tends to
rely only on traditional trust-based relationships, however, such as family ties and dealings be-
tween conventional fiduciaries and their beneficiaries. This Article's thesis is that trust is an im-
portant factor even in arm's length negotiations.
139. A more complete description of negotiation regulation would include an analysis, per-
haps based on Williamson's broad version of the concept of opportunism, see supra notes 24-26
and accompanying text, of the legal rules governing fraud and nondisclosure. Such an analysis,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
140. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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relationships between business actors.14 An important part of these re-
lationships is an understanding of the degree of trust that the parties
repose in one another.142 Some parties seek trusting business relations
to secure efficiency gains. Others are conditioned by psychological or
philosophical predispositions to seek trusting relations. In either case,
risking assets appears to be an important signal in the processes of
searching out trustworthy business partners, constructing trusting rela-
tionships, and maintaining trust once it is established.
A. The Dilemma of Trust
Parties negotiate because they feel that coordinating their goals
with the goals of others will yield better results than acting alone.143 In
a world in which people act to maximize their own gains from trade,
this process of coordination and cooperation is fraught with difficulty.
Scholars have long recognized that most negotiations present bargainers
with mixed incentives that make cooperation extremely difficult. 4 4
Negotiators want to receive the benefit of cooperation, but also seek to
minimize their exposure to risk of exploitation.
45
Conflict theorist Morton Deutsch has suggested three basic ways in
which parties solve the mixed-motive problem to guarantee that an ex-
change will be reciprocated: (1) simultaneous exchange; (2) use of third
parties; and (3) use of "hostages" or deposits to ensure commitment to
the reciprocal arrangement. 48 These mechanisms are used frequently in
141. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. Indeed, research discloses that American
managers lead the world in their tendency to trust in the context of commercial dealings. In a
comparative study of nationalities, American managers scored highest in their tendency to trust,
while Greek businesspeople scored highest in their tendency to be suspicious. See D. HARNTr & L.
CUMMINGS, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR. AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 124 (1980).
143. D. LAx & W. SEBENIUS, supra note 62, at 11 (stating that "[w]hen interdependence,
conflict, and the potential for opportunism are present, people can negotiate to arrive at a joint
decision that is better than their unilateral alternatives").
144. See, e.g., R. LzwicKi & L. LiTTERR, supra note 51, at 107 (finding that "[m]ost [bar-
gaining] situations are 'mixed motive' "); H. RAiFFA, supra note 126, at 33; J. RUBIN & B. BROWN,
supra note 51, at 10.
145. As one commentator has put it:
Mixed motive conflict is characterized by the presence of (a) the possibility of mutually bene-
ficial cooperation, (b) the temptation to compete so as to exploit the other person's coopera-
tion, (c) a lack of trust of the other person because of the possibility of his yielding to the
temptation to exploit, and (d) the possibility of mutually harmful joint competition arising
from both the temptation to compete and the requirement to compete to defend against
exploitation.
Lindskold, Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Con-
flict and Cooperation, 85 PSYCHOLOGIcAL BULL. 772, 772 (1978).
146. M. DEUTSCH, supra note 14, at 161. Commercial parties, unlike terrorists or nations
under siege, do not use hostages in the literal sense. Some features of transactional exchange,
however, can be analogized to the use of hostages to guarantee reciprocity in exchange. See Wil-
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commercial negotiation to solve cooperation problems. Parties arrange
for "closings" in which they exchange documents and funds simultane-
ously. Third parties such as escrow agents and sureties facilitate coop-
eration by guaranteeing performance. Indeed, the use of preliminary
contracts enlists a third party-the state-to enforce bargaining norms
to which the parties have agreed. Finally, money deposits assure that
parties will go through with negotiations subject to specified conditions
of performance.
14 7
The use of these solutions, however, may be problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. First, simultaneous exchanges at preliminary bargaining
stages conflict with the exploratory, give-and-take nature of negotiation.
Second, the desired structure of the transaction may render mecha-
nisms such as preliminary contracts too costly or awkward. Preliminary
contracts setting out explicit duties during negotiation require addi-
tional bargaining, costly drafting, and still may be difficult to enforce. 148
Strategic concerns also limit the amount of preliminary bargaining in
which parties are willing to engage. For example, demands for particu-
lar preliminary terms may reveal more about the party making the de-
mand than the party wishes.149 Preliminary dickering also may
dissipate good will that the parties hope to draw on in the negotiation
of the main contract.15 0 Third, the use of third parties such as sureties
and escrow agents is expensive and may be impractical at early stages
of negotiations. Fourth, deposits are also costly and may discourage ne-
gotiations between parties with limited or illiquid assets.""
llamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. RFV. 519
(1983).
147. In real estate transactions, buyers often pay a deposit (downpayment) toward the
purchase price that is forfeited if they abort the transaction without a proper excuse. See, e.g.,
Lundstrom v. Hackle, 40 Colo. App. 322, 579 P.2d 85 (1978); Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Galbo, 68
N.Y.2d 373, 502 N.E.2d 184, 509 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986). The bid bond used in construction contracts
is another example of this device. See supra note 117. In the merger and acquisition sphere, some
business brokers require a potential buyer to put up a cash deposit equal to the asking price
"before he is permitted to dig through financial statements." Jamison, Hunting that Elusive Crea-
ture, the Big Deal, Wall St. J., July 30, 1990, at A8, col. 3. When the acquiring firm has more
bargaining leverage, it may seek to negotiate a preliminary contract with the target firm that pays
the buyer a "cancellation fee" if the seller walks away from the deal. Berkovitch, Bradley &
Khanna, Tender Offer Auctions, Resistance Strategies, and Social Welfare, 5 JL. EcoN. & ORGAN-
IZATON 395, 403 n.8, 404 (1989).
148. Courts only recently have begun to recognize contractual promises to bargain in good
faith. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
149. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of De-
fault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (noting that one source of incompleteness in contracts is
"strategic behavior by relatively informed parties," who are worried about revealing private infor-
mation regarding preferences and intentions to the other side during negotiation).
150. Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 53, at 188 (arguing that extensive negotiation over con-
tractual safeguards is essentially zero-sum bargaining that dissipates good will and trust).
151. One buyer looking to acquire a business commented that the deposit requirement im-
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The awkwardness or expense of more formal means of assuring re-
ciprocal exchange motivate parties to seek other ways of constructing
cooperative bargaining relationships. The basis of all alternatives is one
of the most fragile, yet powerful human dispositions-interpersonal
trust.152 Parties prefer to deal based on trust because it lowers the
transaction costs inherent in the alter iative approach of bargaining
based on mutual suspicion. Moreover, trust signalsthat postcontractual
relationships with the same or future partners can be based on mutu-
ally beneficial understanding and flexibility rather than on strict adher-
ence to legal rights and contract terms. 53
Business dealings grounded entirely in trust are rare, 54 particularly
in the incipient stages of negotiations. Perhaps even more unusual,
however, are successful business dealings that lack trust as a strong part
of the relationship.'55 The cost savings that trust can yield are too great
posed by some business brokers "is probably a screening method so brokers can be assured of
dealing with buyers who are more stupid than they are." Jamison, supra note 147, at As, col. 4.
152. The concept of trust is as difficult to define as opportunism. See supra notes 22-27 and
accompanying text. As used in this Article, trust connotes a belief that others can be depended on
and that they will not harm the party who reposes trust in them. Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?,
in COOPERATIvE RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 219 (asserting that "trusting a person means believing
that when offered the chance, he or she is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us").
Action taken based on trust "increases one's vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under
one's control . . . and . . . takes place in a situation where the penalty suffered if the trust is
abused would lead one to regret the action." Lorenz, supra note 8, at 197.
153. B. BARBER, supra note 15, at 130 (asserting that "[w]hen differences occur over contract
performance, businessmen resort to informal trustful dealings first and to legal procedures only as
a last resort"). Research discloses that many commercial parties rely on mutual trust to resolve
differences after contract performance has begun, even when they have negotiated an elaborate
agreement. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 55 (1963). The ability to make such amicable adjustments arguably is related to the degree of
trust that the parties establish in the negotiation stage of their relationship.
154. These relationships, however, do occur. For example, until recent reforms decentralized
the contracting practices of the Soviet government, the USSR enjoyed an exceptional reputation
for reliable payment for imported foreign goods. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that
certain British trading companies dealt with the Soviets entirely "on trust," thus saving the sub-
stantial transaction costs associated with the institution of contract. Gumbel & Hays, Perestroika
Bombs at Its Big Tryout in the Trade Arena, Wall St. J., June 21, 1990, at 1, col. 1. The article
quoted a British trade executive as saying, "All our business here was on trust. . . .There were
occasions when the contract was simply forgotten. We delivered and were paid." Id. Other firms
report that they had been able to dispense with costly letters of credit and export insurance in
their dealings with the USSR. Id. This desirable situation now has backfired as new Soviet manag-
ers in a staggering economy are refusing to pay for goods shipped. Id.
155. D. PaurrT, supra note 14, at 92 (remarking that even low-risk bargaining moves require
"some degree of trust"). As one set of commentators has explained:
Trust is the binding force in most productive buyer/seller relationships. No amount of detail
in the formal written contract, no abundance of legal staff to fight for recompense, no form of
recourse can provide the buyer with such a high expectation of a satisfying exchange relation-
ship as a simple, basic trust of the salesperson and the company that he or she represents.
Hawes, Mast & Swan, supra note 14, at 1; see also Lorenz, supra note 8, at 209 (surmising that
"[w]hile trust is costly, lack of trust is more costly still").
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to ignore when evaluating potential contracting partners during the ne-
gotiation process.""6 It becomes vitally important, therefore, for parties
to signal their willingness and ability to foster trust.
The problem with trust as a mechanism for developing cooperation
is that it presents negotiators with a mixed-motive puzzle. Both parties
benefit by trusting each other, but each party suffers if its trust is
abused. 15 The situation faced by negotiators wanting to build trust,
therefore, is essentially a "prisoner's dilemma.""' This dilemma is illus-
trated by reference to the following hypothetical matrix of choices and
payoffs faced by negotiators A and B as they square off across the bar-
gaining table.5 9
156. R. LWICKI & L. LrrTER, supra note 51, at 111 (stating that mutually beneficial, in-
tegrative bargaining is fostered by the elimination of mistrust as a destructive factor in the bar-
gaining process); Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in
CoopmuaTv RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 104 (arguing that a "lack of trust ... reduces the range
of possibilities for rational action" and "prevents, above all, capital investment under conditions of
uncertainty and risk"); Pagden, The Destruction of Trust and Its Economic Consequences in the
Case of Eighteenth Century Naples, in CooPEAnTwE RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 130 (stating that
"[e]conomic transactions are clearly more heavily dependent on agencies of trust than any other").
157. Morton Deutsch has defined trust precisely in these terms:
We define "trust" as follows: An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an
event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which he perceives
to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than
positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed.
Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 265, 266 (1958) (emphasis in original).
He uses the example of hiring a baby sitter. If one's trust in the baby sitter is confirmed, the most
one can expect is a pleasant evening out of the house. If one's trust is abused, harm may come to
the baby. Id.
158. The prisoner's dilemma has evolved into one of the most powerful analytic tools in so-
cial science for the investigation of problems of human cooperation. See R. AxELROD, THE EVOLU-
77ON OF COOPERATION 28 (1984) (asserting that "[t]he iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the
E. coli of social psychology"); M. DEUTSCH, supra note 14, at 208; R LEwicKi & L. LrrrERER, supra
note 51, at 35. The name "prisoner's dilemma" comes from the original story used to illustrate the
paradox of cooperation. The story depicted two prisoners charged with the same crime but held in
different cells. Police investigators approached each prisoner with the same two choices: Confess or
remain silent. If one prisoner confessed and the other remained silent, the confessing prisoner
could go free and the silent prisoner would be sentenced to five years imprisonment based on the
testimony of the confessing prisoner. If both confessed, they each would receive a three-year sen-
tence. If both remained silent, they each would receive a one-year sentence. The dilemma arises
because neither prisoner knows what choice the other prisoner will make. If prisoner A remains
silent, he may receive the worst result-five years in jail. Yet confession may bring a higher jail
term than if both remain silent. Thus, the safest choice is confession, but the prisoners both will be
better off if they can trust each other to remain silent. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 43, at 2022 n.50.
Professors Lax and Sebenius have noted that, as a business deal evolves, negotiators repeatedly
face a "negotiator's dilemma" in selecting communication strategies and tactics. D. LAx & J.
SmEEmus, supra note 62, at 29-45. It is in the parties' mutual interests to engage in cooperative,
trusting behavior. At the same time, however, it is in each party's individual interest to distort
information and exploit vulnerabilities. Id.
159. This matrix is taken from D. PRurrT, supra note 14, at 107. The values assigned to the
payoffs, while not empirical, do serve to illustrate, holding other factors constant, the relative ad-











The upper left quadrant, in which both parties trust and take risks,
yields a payoff of 12 to each negotiator and a total of 24 for the whole
transaction. If only one party trusts, the total payoff drops to 18 be-
cause the efficiency and candor of a mutually trusting bargaining ex-
change remain untapped. The suspicious party, however, having
withheld its cooperation, may seek to capture as many as 17 of the 18
payoff points by exploiting the other side's trust. If neither party trusts
the other, they have a payoff of only 12 to divide at 6 each.
Faced with these choices, A may choose to trust B. Consequently,
A may reveal information or commit resources. A's trust will increase
the surplus available to both parties, but it exposes A to exploitation by
B. On the other hand, A may choose to distrust B. This orientation will
yield dramatic benefits to A if B trusts and A is willing to exploit that
trust.160
Because both sides realize that their trust is subject to exploitation,
however, both parties likely will choose to mistrust. This scenario guar-
antees each party a yield of 6 and a chance at 17. The mutual election
to distrust reduces the size of the joint surplus to its lowest point and
thereby limits the possible gains from trade for both sides.
The negotiator's goal is to overcome the barriers that force the par-
ties to act suspiciously, which will permit the better choice of mutual
trust and cooperation.'16 The processes by which negotiators build trust
160. Party A may not be willing to exploit B's trust out of a concern for ethics, reputation, or
some other principle. The problem is that B cannot be certain of A's trustworthiness. To clear this
hurdle, A must find ways to communicate credibly to B that it is trustworthy. If both sides can
signal successfully their trustworthiness to each other, the mixed-motive puzzle is solved. The par-
ties then can enjoy the mutually advantageous payoffs of the upper-left quadrant.
161. See Lindskold, supra note 145, at 772. The article asserts that "[b]asic to cooperation is
the trust of the other party ... If the other party could only be trusted to be cooperative in
search of the mutually beneficial solution, then the cycle [of distrust and competition] could be
reversed, and both parties could gain rather than lose." Id.
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are, thus, crucial to the success of many commercial relationships and
the economic well-being of society as a whole.
B. The Process of Building Mutual Trust
There is no patented method of building trust-" ' Situational63 and
personality 64 variables both play a part in setting the conditions for
establishing trust.165 Similarity of backgrounds and tastes also helps
smooth the way to trusting relations.
1 66
Regardless of the factors facilitating trust, however, unilateral,
transaction-specific investments are important signals in the process of
building and maintaining trusting relationships. 1 7 The mixed-motive
162. R. LEwicKi & L. LITTERER, supra note 51, at 111 (stating that "[g]enerating trust is a
complex, uncertain process").
163. Trust may arise spontaneously from unusual situations in which people are forced by
circumstances to cooperate with one another. Gambetta, supra note 152, at 225-27. Once trust is
developed, it may persist after the crisis has passed. Id.
164. Psychologists have determined that some people have "high-trust" personalities-they
are willing to give people the benefit of the doubt until they are proven wrong. R. LEwicia & L.
LrrrnR~, supra note 51, at 270-72; Rotter, A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal
Trust, 35 J. PERSONALrrY 651 (1967). "Low-trust" personality types take the opposite view and
treat others with suspicion until they prove to be trustworthy. Rotter, supra, at 651. Moral or
religious feelings are also possible sources of trust. Gambetta, supra note 152, at 231.
165. Situational factors appear to have slightly more influence than personality in determin-
ing the level of cooperation between people. Terhune, The Effects of Personality in Cooperation
and Conflict, in THE STRUCTURE OF CoNFLT 218 (P. Swingle ed. 1970).
166. R. LEwicIu & L. LrrrERER, supra note 51, at 112 (asserting that trust is enhanced by
similarity of background).
167. N. LUHMANN, supra note 15, at 24 (formulating the problem of trust as "a gamble, a
risky investment"); Lillibridge & Lundstedt, Some Initial Evidence for an Interpersonal Risk
Theory, 66 J. PSYCHOLOGY 119, 120 (1967) (arguing that risky behavior supports maintenance or
enhancement of trust); Lindskold, supra note 145, at 789 (stating that psychological "attribution
principles" suggest that "voluntarily risking vulnerability and being open and consistent will pro-
mote the attribution of trustworthiness"); Lundstedt, Interpersonal Risk Theory, 62 J. PSYCHOL-
OGY 3 (1966) (discussing how the willingness to give away influence and control can foster trusting
relationships); Swinth, .The Establishment of the Trust Relationship, 11 J. CONFLICT RKSoLrnoN
335 (1967) (discussing empirical support for the mechanism of initiating trust through taking uni-
lateral, risk-exposing steps). Research from a variety of sources reinforces the conclusion stated in
this Article. The "tit-for-tat" strategy for playing, the iterated prisoner's dilemma is one of the
most consistently successful methods of achieving high cooperation in mixed-motive situations. R.
AXELROD, supra note 158, at 27-54. A crucial part of the strategy is a willingness to make a cooper-
ative first move and, therefore, risk exploitation during initial interaction with the opposition. Id.
at 113-17 (discussing the "never be the first to defect" rule); Gambetta, supra note 152, at 227
(asserting that "when the game has no history, a cooperative first move is essential to set it on the
right track"; such a move requires a "predisposition to trust"). Once this trustworthiness is shown
in the first interaction, the tit-for-tat strategy simply mimics the other party's behavior in the
preceding period. R. AXELROD, supra note 158, at 31. The model of unilateral risk taking to build
trust also is supported by Professor Charles Osgood's Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in
Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy for resolving international conflicts. C. OSGOOD, AN ALTERNA-
TIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER 85-134 (1962). Central features of the GRIT proposal are the unilateral
announcement and execution of tension-reducing initiatives and the continuation of these initia-
tives even when they are not reciprocated. R. LEwICKI & L. Lrrrmum, supra note 51, at 283-85;
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nature of most commercial exchanges makes it difficult to convince the
other side that one can be trusted to act cooperatively.1 6 8 The risk in-
herent in making a precontractual investment is a powerful way to sig-
nal one's trustworthiness and commitment to a cooperative regime.169
This committal reassures others who are naturally suspicious of one's
intentions. In addition, precontractual investments indicate that the in-
vestor is prepared to trust the other side. Finally, investments may in-
still a sense of obligation in the other party to reciprocate trust, thus
setting in motion a cycle of mutually beneficial trusting acts.
170
Professor Dean Pruitt has described several actions that negotiat-
ing parties use as signals that they either are trustworthy or willing to
trust the other party. 1 7  Relatively low-risk steps include attempts to
Lindskold, supra note 145, at 775-77. The GRIT strategy has been proven an effective means of
inducing trust. Lindskold, supra note 145, at 777; Lindskold & Collins, Inducing Cooperation by
Groups and Individuals, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 679, 680, 688 (1978); Lindskold & Finch,
Styles of Announcing Conciliation, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 145, 147 (1981) (noting that "[t]he
experimental support for the GRIT proposal is substantial" and that GRIT "presents a model
against which communication patterns can be compared for their effectiveness in inducing trust in
conflict").
168. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
169. R. LEwiCKI & L. LrrraRER, supra note 51, at 112 (suggesting that "we are more likely to
trust people who initiate cooperative, trust behavior"); D. PRurrr, supra note 14, at 124-31 (argu-
ing that trust can be built during bargaining by taking various kinds of risks); Golembiewski &
McConkie, supra note 14, at 140 (stating that while there is no solid empirical justification for
concluding that "risk and trust are high, direct covariants," there is "no question that trust can be
increased by substantial risk-taking behavior").
170. Many people adhere to a deeply felt norm of reciprocity. In other words, "the mere fact
that someone has placed his trust in us makes us feel obligated, and this makes it harder to betray
that trust." Dasgupta, Trust As a Commodity, in COOPERATE RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 49, 53;
see also R LEwicIu & L. LrrrERER, supra note 51, at 195-96 (recounting a Nigerian commercial
custom in which shopkeepers give customers a small gift upon entering to trigger the "universal
norm of reciprocity"); Gambetta, supra note 152, at 234 (agreeing that "the concession of trust
... can generate the very behavior which might logically seem to be its precondition"). These
patterns of trust development exist not only in business dealings but also in basic social relations.
Haas & Deseran, Trust and Symbolic Exchange, 44 Soc. SCL Q. 3,4 (1981) (asserting that "trust is
necessary in any relationship, although the amount of trust required may vary with the nature of
the relationship"). In the personal realm, trusting relations grow through a series of "gradually
increasing investments in the relationship, a series in which the partners can demonstrate their
trustworthiness to each other." Id. at 3; see W. BENNIS, E. ScHmN, F. STEELE & D. BERLEW, INTER-
PERSONAL DYNAMIcs: ESSAYS ANn READINGS ON HUMAN INTERACTION 217 (1964) (noting that people
build trust by exposing more and more of their "selves" to each other, thus creating a mutually
reinforcing pattern, because "when one person trusts enough to make himself vulnerable by expos-
ing himself, trust is generated in the other person"); P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SocuL LWxE
98 (1964). Clearly, business and social relations may be quite different. For example, the explicit
nature of reciprocal actions in a commercial relationship may not fit in a personal relation in which
"the authenticity and value of social approval or other nonmaterial rewards depend heavily on
their not being provided simply as an inducement for some other reward." D. JOHNSON, SOcMoLOGI-
CAL THEOaY 363 (1981) (emphasis in original); Gambetta, supra note 152, at 231 (arguing that "[i]f
X detects instrumentality behind my manifestations of friendship, he is more likely to reject me
and, if anything, trust me even less").
171. Pruitt categorizes these actions as low-, moderate-, and high-risk steps. D. PRUrT, supra
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form social or quasi-social relationships through demonstrations that
the parties share similar backgrounds and interests.172 As noted earlier,
similarity of backgrounds and tastes enhances the conditions for
trust.17 3 These social relations frequently are marked by symbolic, uni-
lateral "investments," such as gifts and exchanges of food or drink.
174
Another low-risk step is the use of deliberate signals at the bargaining
table that enable parties to suggest possible areas of compromise and
flexibility without committing the signaler to any particular conces-
sion.17s These low-risk behaviors preserve negotiators' bargaining posi-
tions, while enabling them to test the other side's willingness to engage
in a reciprocal relationship. 76
High-risk behavior differs both in style and effect from low-risk
conduct. Examples of high-risk coordinative moves include large con-
cessions, unilateral, tension-reducing actions, statements regarding mo-
tive, ' 77 and any other step that puts the negotiator at clear risk of
loss. 7 s These steps risk loss of reputation, bargaining position, informa-
note 14, at 92. For purposes of the discussion, this Article combines Pruitt's low- and moderate-
risk actions into a single "low-risk" category.
172. Lorenz, supra note 8, at 207-08 (stating that business people tend to create through
"personal contact" an intermediate level of human relationship somewhere "between friend and
stranger, for which capitalist societies have developed a distinctive tolerance").
173. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. Business parties often make investments in
indirect signals of similarity by joining clubs, associations, and other networks. Membership in
these groups signals a set of underlying backgrounds and interests that help to foster trust in
certain encounters in the bargaining arena. Gambetta, supra note 152, at 232.
174. Haas & Deseran, supra note 170, at 4, 7-9 (noting that personal relationships of trust
often involve symbolic exchanges of food and drink, gifts, love tokens, attendance at formal cere-
monies, and visits).
175. D. PaurrT, supra note 14, at 93-99. For example, parties unwilling to make outright
concessions out of fear of being exploited may signal their willingness to concede by remaining
curiously silent when the other party makes a proposal incorporating that concession. Id. at 94. To
be successful, the signal "must be noticeable, that is, stand out as figure against ground, and yet be
disavowable if it does not produce a coordinative response." Id. These signals are risky because
they communicate information regarding the sender's flexibility and expose the sender to the pos-
sibility of nonreciprocation. Id.
176. During the beginning stages of bargaining, initial tests of reciprocity include negotiators'
revealing of "specific information about themselves, their needs, or their resources. If the relation-
ship is to survive this stage, intimate disclosure must be reciprocated." Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, supra
note 14, at 16.
177. Sincere statements that one is ready to trust the other side are in the high-risk category
and can enhance the chances for cooperation. Research has shown that people respond to direct
communications by others who propose a cooperative relationship as an alternative to mutually
disadvantageous competition. Deutsch, supra note 157, at 275 (noting that "it is evident that mu-
tual trust can be established in people with an individualistic orientation through communica-
tion"). The development of trust is enhanced considerably if the proposal to cooperate is
announced as a unilateral decision grounded in stated reasons rather than presented in a cautious,
"I will if you will" fashion. Lindskold & Finch, supra note 167, at 153.
178. D. PRUITT, supra note 14, at 94.
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tion, and future opportunities to resume a hard bargaining stance.179
Business parties may build trust through unilateral risk-taking ei-
ther by gradually increasing the level of risk'80 or by moving directly to
high-risk steps if warranted by the circumstances. i 18  The sequential
give-and-take of many negotiations makes reciprocation of low-risk
steps obvious and express, thus enhancing the likelihood of construct-
ing a successful relationship.'82 Parties unwilling to engage in even ten-
tative, low-risk reciprocal exchanges discourage progression to riskier
forms of conciliatory, cooperative action. If the parties establish a de-
gree of trust, however, a "lock-in" effect emerges that maintains the
momentum of cooperation throughout the course of the relationship. 83
For parties to reap the rewards of cooperation, they somehow must
progress to the level of high-risk steps. First, low-risk moves take par-
ties only part of the distance toward establishing trust because their
179. Id. at 92.
180. The parties would begin by reciprocating low-risk steps and progress to higher levels of
risk. See Dasgupta, supra note 170, at 64-66 (discussing the need for repeated encounters to de-
velop trust); Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, supra note 14, at 16-24. The Dwyer article presents a model of
the stages in business relationships: (1) awareness, (2) exploration, (3) expansion, (4) commitment,
and (5) dissolution. The exploration stage permits parties to gather experiences of one another
before deciding to move to the expansion and commitment stages. Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, supra note
14, at 16-24.
181. Some commercial situations demand high-risk moves without allowing the luxury of a
gradual trust-building process. The construction project bidding process is an example. See supra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text. The actual mechanism for establishing a trusting relation-
ship-the sequence of risk-taking steps needed to overcome the mixed-motive dilemma-can take
two forms. Swinth, supra note 167, at 336-37. Both mechanisms, however, call for an initial move
by one party that will expose it to risk. Id. One mechanism calls for the initiator to take a step that
exposes him to a risk of loss. If the responding person can forego a personal gain and also save the
trust initiator from incurring its loss, the cycle of trust building is complete and "a degree of trust"
is established. Id. at 336. If the situation does not permit parties to forego personal gains, a four-
step procedure will produce the same result. First, the initiator exposes itself to a risk of loss.
Second, the responding party acknowledges that step but takes no action to profit by it. Third, the
responding party exposes itself to a risk of loss. Finally, the initiator takes no advantage of the
responding party. Id. at 336-37. Swinth tested these models experimentally and confirmed both
procedures. Id. at 343.
182. Brickman, Becker & Castle, Making Trust Easier and Harder Through Two Forms of
Sequential Interaction, 37 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 515, 520 (1979) (showing that in an
experiment with males, a much higher degree of cooperation was achieved in a game involving
alternating choices than in one involving simultaneous choices); Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, supra note
14, at 16 (asserting that "[t]hrough questions and answers, buyers and sellers develop a process of
taking turns, making interaction easier"); Hake & Schmid, Acquisition and Maintenance of Trust-
ing Behavior, 35 J. Exam rNTAL NALYsTs B-HAv. 109, 121 (1981); Schmid & Hake, Fast Acquisi-
tion of Cooperation and Trust: A Two-Stage View of Trusting Behavior, 40 J. ExPEmmzNTAL
ANALYsIs BEHAV. 179, 179 (1983).
183. M. DEuTsCH, supra note 14, at 30-31 (stating that both competition and cooperation
tend to be self-confirming); R. LEwicKi & L. LrrrPR, supra note 51, at 113 (discussing the "lock-
in" effects of cooperation); J. Rum & B. BROWN, supra note 51, at 265 (discussing "lock-in"
effects).
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low cost renders them easily faked and, hence, less credible. 8 4 Steps
that subject a party to substantial loss are more convincing and, there-
fore, can form the basis for a more stable and productive relation-
ship.8 5 Second, high-risk steps move the parties beyond mere
coordination of a zero-sum, distributive bargaining regime to a truly co-
operative relationship in which they are able to create, not merely di-
vide, economic value from their interaction.
The cases examined in Part II illustrate the importance of high-
risk steps in the process of trust development and the consequences
that occur when the trust-building process is cut short by opportunistic
behavior. For example, in Smith v. Dravo Corp. s6 the buyer, Union,
entered into negotiation by professing an interest in purchasing only a
few container units. Upon learning that the seller was eager to sell,
however, Union expanded the negotiation to include the entire
container business. Union then requested generous information disclo-
sure ostensibly to price its bid adequately.
The Dravo Corp. opinion does not recount the initial steps that the
parties took to establish a trusting relationship. The rapid expansion of
the deal, however, suggests that a highly cooperative tone dominated
early communications. Had the seller been reluctant to reveal informa-
tion under the circumstances, its reticence may have put the negotia-
tions back on a competitive footing disadvantageous to both sides.
Thus, the seller opted to make a series of unilateral, high-risk moves.
At Union's request, the seller revealed its patent application, product
files, and a working model of the container. Next, it led Union on a tour
of its plant. When Union had all the information it needed, the seller
184. At the low-risk level, "conventional [trust-inducing] gestures can be counterfeited."
Haas & Deseran, supra note 170, at 5; see Lindskold & Finch, supra note 167, at 153-54 (re-
marking that "inferences drawn about the characteristics of an actor from his or her actions will be
made more confidently if the actions are risky and potentially costly to the actor"). Trust is a
disposition attributed by others. Psychologists have developed two principles-the augmentation
principle and the "discounting" principle-that explain when attributions are likely to be strong or
weak. See K. SHAVER, THE ATrRmtUTON oF BLAME .54 (1985) (discussing discounting and augmenta-
tion principles); Kelly, The Processes of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGWST 107, 113-14
(1973). The augmentation principle holds that "a person's act will be viewed as expressive of his
true dispositions if the act involves risk of loss or actual costs." Lindskold, supra note 145, at 774.
Thus, if people are truthful when it hurts them to be so, others more likely will think they are
genuinely truthful people. It follows that costly bargaining signals will be viewed more credibly
than those costing less. The augmentation principle is offset by the discounting principle, which
states that acts will be viewed as less expressive of people's true dispositioh if there are "apparent
external causes" for them. Id. The literature on economic "signaling" supports this notion in that
signals are more credible when they are costly or difficult to fake. R. FRANK, supra note 16, at 99.
185. Dasgupta, supra note 170, at 70 (suggesting that truly trustworthy people must spend
extra resources to distinguish themselves from people who are trying merely to imitate the appear-
ance of trustworthiness).
186. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
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then made several substantial price concessions. In response, Union ex-
ploited the seller's trust by breaking off discussions and using the
seller's design information to build a similar, competing container
unit.
187
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 88 Channel Home Centers v. Gross-
man,1 8 9 and Gadsden Paper & Supply Co. v. Washburn'" display more
subtle forms of opportunism. In all of these cases, various conciliatory
announcements induced plaintiffs to invest transaction-specific re-
sources. The plaintiffs believed that the investments would serve not
only their own interests but the interests of the overall commercial rela-
tionship as well. These steps represented the most credible type of
high-risk signals, indicating the parties' readiness to cooperate and save
considerable resources for both sides.
In Hoffman " the plaintiff undertook costly steps to leave his old
profession and train himself as a grocer. These investments would have
benefited both the franchisee and the franchisor had the deal gone
through. The franchisor's response to each of these signals was encour-
aging. Through this series of nibbles, the franchisor convinced Hoffman
to commit to the deal.19 2 It then attempted to appropriate a greater
share of the bargaining surplus by raising the amount of the capital
investment required and demanding that Hoffman's father contribute
to the enterprise by way of a substantial gift.
In Channel Home Centers193 the inducement appeared in a letter
of intent that promised the prospective tenant (Channel) that the land-
lord would "negotiate . . . to completion" the shopping center rental
agreement.9 " Channel's site improvement investments were for the mu-
tual benefit of the parties, and the parties' ability to coordinate in the
absence of a binding lease foretold a very cooperative relationship for
187. Id. at 372-73. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1987), exhibited the
same pattern. During negotiations to sell his company, the seller in Skycom was persuaded to turn
over a valuable asset. When this asset was safely in the buyer's hands, the buyer simply declined to
go forward with the deal. Id. at 812-13; see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
188. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
189. 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
190. 554 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 1989).
191. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Professor Mark Gergen recently has argued
that Hoffman should be thought of as a case of negligent misrepresentation or mistake, rather than
a case of breached promise. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 2-3, 31-40. Even if Red Owl were simply
careless in its representations, however, its acts were opportunistic in that they caused Hoffman to
invest transaction-specific assets to further Red Owl's interests as a future supplier and creditor of
Hoffman and as a condition of entering a binding contract. Id. at 32-33 n.153 (noting that Red Owl
admitted at trial that its added conditions were designed to enhance its credit position). My own
view is that, at best, Red Owl acted recklessly in this regard.
193. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
194. Channel Home Centers, 795 F.2d at 293.
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the future. When the landlord walked away from the agreement and
rented to a higher paying tenant, it violated an implicit, but material,
term of this relationship-the trust Channel exhibited by investing
heavily before a contract was signed.
In Gadsden Paper' the plaintiff turned over his only valuable as-
set-his customers-in a transaction that he presumed to be the sale of
his business. The buyer offered a cooperative signal: both parties would
save transaction costs if the deal were structured as an at-will employ-
ment arrangement instead of a sale of assets. The seller trusted this
signal and reciprocated by foregoing alternative contractual protections.
Thus the plaintiff increased the potential value of the transaction to
both parties. At the same time he unfortunately exposed himself to a
risk of loss. The buyer subsequently seized on the seller's cooperation as
an opportunity to acquire the seller's business without paying.
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.'9' and Collins v. Philadelphia Oil
Co.19 7 provide a third variation on the theme of trust and opportunistic
conduct. In these two cases the parties did not engage in sequential
exchanges that ultimately led to high-risk cooperative moves. Rather,
the structure of the transaction pushed the plaintiffs to commit re-
sources before important segments of the transaction under the defend-
ants' control had become final. The initial price agreements in both
Star Paving and Collins suggest that the parties had concluded a defi-
nite stage of the coordination process and that the matter of price was
settled, even if the contracts were not. With no signs of a competitive
regime in which each party was expected to erect a full set of transac-
tional defenses to guarantee reciprocal trust, the parties were justified
in taking high-risk actions with the assurance that they would not be
ambushed. After the plaintiffs relied on the price agreement by setting
up a dependent transaction, however, the defendants opportunistically
sought to usurp the profits from the second transactions by demanding
a new price in the underlying deal. These actions directly abused the
trust needed to form linked business arrangements in a complex
economy.
195. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
196. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); see supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
Because prime contractors usually are committed to the terms of their bid as soon as they submit
them, see supra note 124 and accompanying text, it seems sensible to place the risk of mistaken
subcontractor bids on the party that is best able to prevent such mistakes-subcontractors-even
in the period between bid submissions and final contract award. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 2.
The danger of opportunism posed by postaward subcontractor bid withdrawals provides an addi-
tional, compelling justification for making subcontractors liable.
197. 97 W. Va. 464, 125 S.E. 223 (1924); see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE ROLE OF LAW IN SUPPORTING TRUST: TOWARD A NEW CAUSE
OF ACTION
A. The Role of Law in Supporting Trust
Making unilateral, conciliatory moves in negotiation, while argua-
bly necessary to induce trust in some circumstances, does not guarantee
a mutually trusting, reliable relationship. To sustain trust and enhance
the chances for reciprocity, parties also must be willing and able to de-
ter those who might act opportunistically after a trusting relationship is
underway.19 Research has shown that people who cooperate uncondi-
tionally do not induce cooperative responses as frequently as those who
are conditionally cooperative-cooperative but willing to retaliate if
their trust is abused. 199 Therefore, there is a need to devise mechanisms
that deter people who are tempted to violate trust.
Legal recourse for victims of opportunistic conduct is one possible
remedy for bolstering the cooperative process.200 There are substantial
198. It pays for the opportunist to pretend to be trustworthy for a number of interactions
with the potential victim to induce the belief that he is trustworthy. See R. FRANK, supra note 16,
at 16. The trick for the opportunist is to induce the maximum degree of high-risk trusting behavior
in the other side with the minimum degree of low-risk exposure to himself. The opportunist thus
remains sufficiently behind the other side in his investment, which makes opportunism profitable.
As the investments by the opponent mount, the rewards of opportunistic behavior increase. Fi-
nally, rewards reach a point at which betrayal of the other's trust becomes attractive regardless of
offsetting concerns for moral worthiness or business reputation. Sobel, A Theory of Credibility, 52
Rzv. EcON. STUD. 557, 570 (1985).
199. See R AXELROD, supra note 158, at 118, 136 (noting that the tit-for-tat strategy requires
reciprocation of "both cooperation and defection" and "turning the other cheek provides an incen-
tive for the other player to exploit you"); i DEUTSCH, supra note 14, at 199-200, 332-37 (finding
that subjects behaved most cooperatively in experiment in which the opponents played the strat-
egy of being conditionally cooperative and adopted a policy of protecting themselves from exploita-
tion by using measured, reliable responses when the subject abused trust); Gruder & Duslak,
Elicitation of Cooperation by Retaliatory and Nonretaliatory Strategies in a Mixed-Motive
Game, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 162, 171 (1973) (confirming effectiveness of inducing coopera-
tion by nonpunitive response strategy). An important part of the GRIT proposal, see supra note
167, also is a willingness to retaliate when trust is abused. Retaliation, however, must be measured
to nullify the opponent's gains from defection rather than to impose positive costs. Lindskold,
supra note 145, at 789.
200. The threat of state-imposed legal sanctions provides the external motivation needed to
spur essentially egoistic opportunists to weigh the costs of their actions on others. Williams, For-
mal Structure and Social Reality, in COOPERATIvE RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 6, 10 (agreeing that
the threat of legal sanctions provides "egoistic macro-motivation" to induce cooperation). The pos-
sibility of legal sanctions also encourages parties who are uncertain about whether to trust. See N.
LUHMANN, supra note 15, at 36 (stating that legal "sanctions in the event of breach of trust offer
some support to someone considering whether to trust" even if the other party has no knowledge
of such sanctions). Given that opportunists are hard to identify, infra notes 203-07 and accompa-
nying text, and that even people who want to trust and cooperate are deterred from doing so by
the structure of mixed-motive situations, supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text, "even parties
with sharply conflicting interests and values may all prefer a set of rules and institutional arrange-
ments regulating the game of coordination. . . to deal with problems of trust" Heymann, supra
note 18, at 830. But see Charny, supra note 47, at 441, 442 (arguing that "conceptions of trust do
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risks, however, associated with legal intervention in the bargaining pro-
cess. First, nonlegal deterrents such as reputational sanctions may pro-
vide adequate protection at much less cost than legal redress. Second,
legal remedies are rather blunt instruments that often cause unantici-
pated and unwanted consequences. Legal rules can create incentives for
unscrupulous plaintiffs to bring groundless claims. Fear of such behav-
ior, may cause some parties to forego bargaining. In addition, inefficient
legal rules add cost to the bargaining process because parties must bar-
gain around their effect. Finally, legal compensation takes some of the
risk out of making high-risk moves through transaction-specific invest-
ments, thereby dampening their effectiveness as trust-related signals.
Before endorsing the legal regulation of bargaining opportunism, there-
fore, one must examine whether the costs of intervention outweigh the
benefits of legal sanctions in the deterrence of precontractual
opportunism.
1. Nonlegal Mechanisms to Deter Opportunism
A number of nonlegal, market mechanisms limit bargaining oppor-
tunism. 20 1 One defensive mechanism is human perception. If people re-
liably could identify opportunists simply through communication and
interaction with them, legal sanctions would not be needed. Parties
seeking trusting business relationships would know when they were
dealing with opportunists, avoid them when possible, and charge them
more for deals when they are unavoidable.202
One commentator recently has argued that people effectively can
discern whom to trust.203 Research indicates, however, that this is a rare
skill. For example, when people tell lies, their focus on maintaining an
appearance of truthfulness in their facial expression causes their hands
not provide plausible grounds for regulation" and that "widespread enforcement of informal com-
mitments based on trust alone would create a dystopia of regulatory oppression").
201. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the market is fully capable of eliminating
opportunism. See Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for
Transaction Cost Theory, 15 AcAD. MGr.r. REv. 500, 511-12 (1990) (arguing that "when the state of
competitive equilibrium is reached the population of economic actors will contain only those whose
behavioral repertoires are biased toward cooperation," and that "the construction of a long-term
relationship based around cooperation and trust is [the] optimal [business arrangement]"). Other
commentators disagree, arguing that "over the long term, low trust and competition 'drive out'
high trust and cooperation." R. LFwicKI & L. LrrrERER, supra note 51, at 272. A third position,
which perhaps comports best with most people's experience, is that there is an ecological balance
between opportunism and trustworthiness, and that sufficient incentives and rewards exist to per-
petuate both types of behavior. R FRANK, supra note 16, at 11, 94-95, 254-55.
202. For example, Donald Trump claims to be "blessed with a kind of intuition that allows
me to sense who the sleazy guys are, and I stay far away from them." D. TRuMP, TRUmp. SuRvmNG
AT THE Top 39 (1990) (discussing how Trump avoided dealing with Ivan Boesky).
203. See R. FRANK, supra note 16, at 134-35.
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to display fewer than normal illustrator movements. 04 Because every-
one has a different amount of normal hand movement, however, this
indicator is difficult to use without knowing the liar extremely well. A
leading empirical scholar on lying and human perception has concluded
that "[f]ew people do better than chance in judging whether someone is
lying or truthful. 2 0 5 More alarmingly, a few people have an extraordi-
nary ability to control the emotional cues that communicate to others
that they are lying.20 6 Even the most skilled observers have trouble de-
tecting when these people are being deceptive. 0 7 Hence, although some
opportunists may be unmasked occasionally, human perception overall
is not a reliable defense to opportunistic behavior.
A second mechanism to combat opportunism is the integration of
firms. Opportunism generally is less likely to occur in transactions
within organizations than in negotiations between different entities.0 8
Intraorganizational transactions are safer because of the strong social
constraints and sanctions against deceit that exist among people who
work together. Monitoring behavior within firms also is more effective
than between firms.20 1 Thus, one reason firms switch from market
transactions to internal transactions is to reduce transaction costs by
controlling opportunistic behavior. 10
Firm integration realistically cannot serve as a broad deterrent
against opportunism. The costs of integration are high relative to many
forms of opportunism. Not all firms have sufficient resources to inte-
grate with others vital to their line of business. Finally, even integrated
firms cannot eliminate opportunism completely because they must deal
with suppliers and customers.1
The third and perhaps most potent nonlegal deterrent to opportu-
nistic behavior is the fear of developing a bad reputation as a business
partner. The "reputation effect" is well documented in business re-
search as contributing significantly to the stability of long-term com-
204. Id. at 131.
205. P. EmAN, supra note 126, at 162.
206. Others may be so prone to self-deception that they will not appear deceptive because
they will have convinced themselves they are telling the truth. R. FRANK, supra note 16, at 131-33.
Professor Paul Ekman has suggested that effective liars are especially well suited for careers as
negotiators. See P. EQAN, supra note 126, at 56-57.
207. P. EmAN, supra note 126, at 57. Interestingly, one of Ekman's studies was conducted
with nursing students. The students who were the best liars also did exceptionally well in their
nursing training. Ekman attributed this to their ability to control their emotions. Id. at 59.
208. Provan & Skinner, Interorganizational Dependence and Control As Predictors of Op-
portuni8m in Dealer-Supplier Relations, 32 AcAD. MGMT. J. 202, 203 (1989).
209. Id.
210. 0. W-L.MSON, supra note 25, at 85-130; Provan & Skinner, supra note 208, at 203-04.
211. Proven & Skinner, supra note 208, at 204.
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mercial relationships. 212 The reputation effect has at least two
dimensions, but neither appears strong enough to deter bargaining op-
portunism effectively in all commercial circumstances.213
The first dimension of the reputation effect is that parties will seek
to maintain reliability and trustworthiness within the context of a par-
ticular commercial relationship. Thus, parties that anticipate repeated
dealings with one another have strong incentives to establish and main-
tain trust as a means of cutting costs over the long run.2 14 These incen-
tives, however, suffer from a number of weaknesses when considered in
the negotiation context. First, empirical evidence suggests that in the
last twenty years commercial parties have become less concerned with
the effects of their reputations with respect to particular business rela-
tionships. Professors Marc Galanter and Joel Rogers recently have as-
serted that the extremely competitive environment of American
business practice beginning in the 1970s has made businesses, at least
in the aggregate, more likely to discount the value of long-term rela-
tionships and to focus instead on the short-term gains that can be cap-
tured by competitive behavior.21 5
More importantly, reputational incentives have only limited force
when parties are engaged in a one-shot transaction, or when one negoti-
ating party either never intends to establish a relationship or intends
for that relationship to be abusive. Parties in one-time transactions, like
the deals in Skycom and Dravo, have limited reputational concerns to-
ward the other party because the parties contemplate no future busi-
212. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Rxv. 549, 618-21
(1984); Gordon, supra note 4, at 1549-50 (stating that "[t]o an economist, an implied contract is
one that is enforced through marketplace mechanisms such as reputation effects rather than in a
court, a means of enforcement that may not bring relief to the aggrieved party but will over time
penalize parties who welsh"); Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 615, 616 (1981); Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts, 53 J.
Bus. 27, 28 (1980).
213. Heymann, supra note 18, at 821-23 (discussing concern for reputation within a particu-
lar relationship and within market as a whole and concluding that "if we had to rely on reputation
alone, the benefits of coordination would escape us in a myriad of situations").
214. R. AxELROD, supra note 158, at 178 (arguing that business transactions are "based upon
the idea that a continuing relationship allows cooperation to develop without the assistance of a
central authority"); Klein & Leffler, supra note 212, at 616; Provan & Skinner, supra note 208, at
204 (noting that the incidence of opportunistic behavior "will probably be low when relations
among organizations are long-term because of the expectation of repeat business").
215. See Galanter & Rogers, A Transformation of American Business Disputing? Some Pre-
liminary Observations 62 (Institute for Legal Studies Working Paper No. DPRP 10-3) (1990) (dis-
cussing the possibility that the number of business disputes has increased and that these disputes
are not handled well by "'traditional' forms of private governance"); see also Friedman, Opening
the Time Capsule: A Progress Report on Studies of Courts Over Time, 24 LAw & Soc'Y Rav. 229,
235-36 (1990); Geyelin, Feuding Firms Cram Courts, Study Says, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 9,
col. 4 (summarizing Galanter and Rogers study and stating that "long-term business relationships




Reputational sanctions also have limited effect on especially venal
parties. Arguably, a defendant like that in Gadsden Paper enters nego-
tiations solely to acquire property, not to establish a commercial rela-
tionship. In Hoffman, on the other hand, the franchisor's bargaining
conduct clearly revealed its intention to dominate any future relation-
ship and abuse the franchisee. Parties like those in Gadsden Paper and
Hoffman will not be deterred by transaction-specific concerns for repu-
tation either because, in their opinion, the rewards of opportunism out-
weigh the costs of losing future business with their opponents, or
because a bargaining power imbalance leads them to discount rela-
tional, reputational concerns.
The second dimension of reputational concern that reduces oppor-
tunistic conduct is a business's reputation in the market as a whole.
Building a general reputation for reliability and trustworthiness has
benefits. Given the mixed-motive character of most business dealings,217
negotiators likely will prefer to deal with trustworthy people rather
than strangers or those known to be untrustworthy.1 8 Put plainly, peo-
ple who act opportunistically in bargaining situations reduce their
chances of acquiring a good reputation and risk developing a distrustful
reputation. In either case, their transaction costs are likely to rise, and
their overall profitability will drop as others insist on dealing with them
cautiously or not at all.
General concern for market reputation has the potential for deter-
ring some bargaining opportunism. To be an effective deterrent, how-
216. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv.
195, 208 (1987) (setting out the argument that "the legal system ... should ... underwrite rela-
tionships of trust, of general reciprocity, and penalize breaches of trust-especially in situations
where the [commercial] relationship is not likely to be a continuing one, so that the sanction of
refusing future dealings is unavailable"). Transaction-specific reputational incentives also suffer
from what has been called a last-period problem. Muris, supra note 4, at 528. If one party knows it
may terminate an existing long-term relationship and the other party is ignorant of this intention,
the knowledgeable party can exploit the trust that has built up over the course of repeated interac-
tions. The last-period problem is important when parties negotiate a series of discrete contracts
between themselves over an extended period of time. See Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass. App. Ct.
361, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985) (discussing lease renewal negotiations); Markov v. ABC Transfer &
Storage Co., 76 Wash. 2d 388, 457 P.2d 535 (1969) (discussing lease renewal negotiations). Profes-
sor Narasimhan has explored this situation in detail. See Narasimhan, Relationship or Boundary,
supra note 4, at 1077.
217. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
218. Opportunists would prefer to deal with trustworthy people because they are more easily
exploited, at least in their initial interaction. Trustworthy people would prefer to deal with other
trustworthy people so they can gain the benefits of cooperation. R. FRANK, supra note 16, at x
(asserting that "we make every effort [in ventures that require trust] to exclude [self-interested
people] in favor of others we believe to be honest"); id. at 54 (arguing that "[tihe potential gain
... from being honest is to cooperate with others who are also honest"). In either case, a market
reputation for trustworthiness attracts bargaining partners.
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ever, information regarding a party's untrustworthiness must be
transmitted efficiently throughout the market. Evidence suggests that
reputational information is not disseminated as readily as one would
hope.
First, ours is a highly mobile society in which it is possible to stay
one step ahead of a bad reputation.2 "19 The costs of researching reputa-
tions is high both in absolute terms and in terms of the resources avail-
able to particular negotiators. Mr. Hoffman, for example, likely had
minimal resources to devote to extensive research into Red Owl's nego-
tiating tactics. Nor would extensive research necessarily provide a de-
finitive return. Hoffman probably was forced to rely on his own
judgment based on his initial experiences of negotiating with Red Owl.
Second, reputational facts, if known, are subject to multiple inter-
pretations. For example, large organizations often can explain to pro-
spective business partners that a particular instance of opportunism
was caused by a corporate agent who no longer influences decisions or
who exceeded company policies. 220 Thus, reputation researchers never
can eliminate their uncertainty about parties with whom they deal.221
This lack of clear return on reputation research no doubt causes firms
to forego extensive reputation checks.222
The advent of nationwide computerized legal research offers an ef-
219. Id. at 112 (noting that in earlier times stable communities encouraged investment in
reputation, and strangers were viewed with some suspicion, whereas "[iln the current environment,
where mobility is very high, the opportunist [is] attracted to the strategy of moving to a new
location each time he [gets] caught cheating" because the mere fact that he is a stranger carries no
negative presumption). Mobility also lowers the returns of investing resources in creating and
maintaining a good reputation because strangers are more likely than friends to assume the worst
about someone and act accordingly. There is evidence of a general decline in trusting behavior in
the past 30 years caused in part by "fewer Americans liv[ing] in the town in which they grew up."
Knack, Why We Don't Vote-Or Say "Thank You," Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
220. The franchisee in Hoffman, for example, did not deal with "Red Owl Stores" in his
negotiations. He dealt with a business agent for Red Owl in the Wisconsin region. Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 686-90, 133 N.W.2d 267, 268-71 (1965). In recruiting franchisees in
another region, it is unlikely that Red Owl would suffer direct reputational effects from the Hoff-
man episode. Even if it did, it could claim plausibly-perhaps even truthfully-that the Wisconsin
business agent acted outside company policy. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 33 n.157 (quoting
Hoffman's testimony that Red Owl's agent was transferred to other duties after the episode that
gave rise to Hoffman's claim).
221. Many forms of opportunism are subtle and can be disclaimed by the opportunist, leav-
ing those outsiders who do hear about the opportunist's reputation to question the real truth.
Gambetta, supra note 152, at 233-34 (asserting that reputation cannot solve the problem of trust
because information is difficult to gather, past behavior may not predict future behavior, proof of
trustworthiness may be limited to evidence that the party has not acted opportunistically, and any
existing evidence may be misinterpreted based on predispositional biases); Good, Individuals, In-
terpersonal Relations and Trust, in CooP.RATrvs RELATIONS, supra note 8, at 38 (stating that
reputation information "will often be ambiguous and open to many readings").
222. Lorenz, supra note 8, at 207 (stating that reputation information is "frequently impossi-
ble" to transmit and business firms tend to rely more on their own experience).
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fective means of transmitting reputational information to the national
market.-2 3 Ironically, however, without a basis for legal actions against
opportunists, this information would be unavailable because there
would be no judicial opinions, court orders, or media reports of
lawsuits.224
It is doubtful, therefore, that nonlegal sanctions alone adequately
deter opportunism in the precontractual phase of business dealings.
The existence of precontractual opportunism lawsuits is some evidence
that reputational incentives do not always induce trust and reliability
in the initial bargaining interactions. As a matter of theory, there is
reason to expect opportunistic conduct by habitual opportunists, par-
ties in one-time transactions, parties near the end of a series of discrete
contracts, and participants in markets characterized by high mobility.
2. The Costs of Making Legal Sanctions Available
Even assuming that nonmarket deterrents are weak in certain com-
mercial circumstances, one still must question whether legal regulation
is an appropriate response to bargaining opportunism. Using the legal
system to deter opportunism is costly. If these costs outweigh the bene-
fits of legal regulation, then society is better off leaving opportunistic
behavior to market forces.
a. Opportunistic Lawsuits
First, legal rules paradoxically can encourage precisely the behavior
they are designed to deter. For example, Part II of this Article dis-
cussed how a rule granting the right to sue for trade secret misappropri-
ation to legitimate sellers of proprietary information may encourage
opportunists to flood potential buyers with vague concepts and later file
spurious legal claims.225 Moreover, making subcontractors' bids irrevo-
cable for a reasonable time after the prime contractor is awarded a con-
tract may enable prime contractors to shop or renegotiate these bids
opportunistically.228
223. Computer searches to discover pending and past legal actions regarding opposing parties
in business negotiations are a common practice in preparing for business deals between sophisti-
cated parties. This practice includes searches of legal and newspaper texts, judicial opinions and
orders, and reports of lawsuits being filed in news journals. Relles, On-Line Services Help Market-
ing, Legal Times, Feb. 19, 1990, § 10, col. 1.
224. In addition, some markets may have only a limited number of buyers or sellers. While
this increases the reputation effect as a general matter, "firms cannot easily avoid opportunistic
organizations because of the small numbers problem." Provan & Skinner, supra note 208, at 202.
In these markets bad reputations simply put people on their guard and raise the costs of transact-
ing business for everyone.
225. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 122.
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Legal intervention thus can result in opportunistic behavior. The
question therefore is which is greater: The amount of opportunistic be-
havior that arises in the absence of legal sanctions or the amount of
opportunism caused by the imposition of legal sanctions. At present,
there is no empirical answer to this question, and reasonable people
could reach different conclusions. My intuition is that unregulated op-
portunism is the more costly of the two.
First, contract-specific investments are costly, and pursuing a legal
claim is both expensive and uncertain. A successful claim requires proof
that parties actually took costly risks. This prerequisite makes it diffi-
cult for parties casually to invoke the legal system without some basis
for their claim. Some parties may be able to fabricate precontractual
investments on occasion, but systematic, widespread opportunism
based on exploited legal protections seems unlikely.
Second, the legal system is flexible and can respond to new forms
of opportunism that arise as a result of legal regulation. For example,
when inventors proved to be opportunistic, the legal system adjusted by
recognizing and enforcing buyers' "anticonfidentiality" agreements.
22 7
These waivers are inexpensive to draft, and the courts, as well as the
market for games and inventions, regulate their use.228
In the subcontractor-contractor context, the law has developed
rules to penalize and deter possible contractor opportunism stemming
from the Star Paving line of cases. If a contractor tries to renegotiate
the price of a subcontractor's bid after the main contract has been
awarded, the contractor loses the right to enforce the subcontractor's
bid and may be forced to accept a higher price. 229 This may not be a
perfect solution when the prime contractor has significant market-
power advantages, but it does restore the legal balance found in Gimbel
and undercuts the possible harm of a Star Paving rule.
b. Overprotection of Naive Negotiators
Legal regulation designed to deter bargaining opportunism could
produce another undesirable side effect: encouraging parties who are
overly cooperative or naive to choose careers in business.23 0 Prudent
227. The law construes these agreements strictly, however, in order to be fair to inventors.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
228. If anticonfidentiality agreements unduly chill the production of new and useful ideas,
firms seeking a competitive advantage will search for new methods of review that do not require
waivers.
229. See supra note 122.
230. See R. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 197 (1988) (reporting that
about 25% of subjects in an experiment cooperated no matter what their opponents did); M.
DEUTSCH, supra note 14, at 169-76 (discussing people who are disposed to "pathological trust" and
for a variety of reasons, ranging from extreme overconfidence to extreme naivety, compulsively fail
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levels of suspicion are healthy and helpful in many mixed-motive busi-
ness dealings. 31 Naive negotiators expecting trustful cooperation will be
victimized, thereby incurring psychological and economic costs them-
selves, imposing these costs on their dependents, and clogging the
courts with complaints. In the absence of legal rules providing recom-
pense, naive negotiators quickly will be driven from the market. Protec-
tive legal rules may retard this process.
This fear of encouraging naive market participants prompts several
responses. First, as argued above, legal rules are costly to enforce and
do not compensate victims perfectly.2 3 2 The truly naive will not return
eagerly to the business world even though they have proven legally that
their reliance or trust was reasonable under the circumstances.233 Pro-
viding compensation, however, may protect them from financial ruin
and provide some deterrence against exploitation of reasonable trusting
behavior.3 4 Moreover, some naive negotiators will mature and acquire
the skills needed to navigate mixed-motive waters. Compensation for
damage resulting from inexperience, then, will enable these parties to
continue their business careers.
Second, a lack of legal regulation might drive out high-trust per-
sons2 3 5 as well as those who trust compulsively. High-trust personalities
are more willing than low-trust personalities to give strangers the bene-
fit of the doubt absent any definitive information about the stranger's
pattern of behavior..23  High-trust personalities often are extremely
trustworthy people. Moreover, research has shown that high-trust per-
sonalities, as opposed to the truly naive, are not more gullible than
those with low-trust personalities. 237 Hence, high-trust people are quite
to assess the risks of opportunism in mixed-motive situations). Research also suggests that some
percentage of people are "committed cooperators" based on principle. Hofstadter, Metamagical
Themes, 248 SCL AM., June 1983, at 14, 27 (finding that 6 out of 20 sophisticated theorists chose to
cooperate with authorities in a single transaction prisoners' dilemma based on the sentiment that
they would rather pay and be right). Both pathological and committed cooperators may be too
rigid in their approach to trust to excel in the business world in which mixed-motive situations are
common and can be quite costly to victims of exploitation.
231. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
233. The danger of overprotection is lessened somewhat because the doctrinal requirements
of promissory estoppel and promissory fraud claims screen out unreasonable business behavior by
plaintiffs. See supra notes 80-88, 102-14 and accompanying text.
234. Mr. Hoffman gave up on franchising after his experience with Red Owl Stores and be-
came an insurance salesperson for a large company. See supra note 87. This transition, however,
was made smoother by the settlement he won from Red Owl. Id.
235. See supra note 164.
236. R. LEWIcI & L. LITTERER, supra note 51, at 272; J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, supra note 51,
at 183 (discussing findings that trusting people are more likely to be trustworthy and, hence, more
likely to be stable partners in cooperative relations).
237. Rotter, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness and Gullibility, 35 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 6
1991]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
capable of sustaining productive business relationships. 3 8 A legal re-
gime that drives high-trust personalities out of the market, therefore,
would not increase the level of market savvy practiced in business or
eliminate court congestion. Instead, the regime would eliminate a group
of people most likely to promote efficiency-enhancing cooperation.
c. Legal Uncertainty
Because legal rules deterring opportunism are imprecise, they will
add costs to conventional bargaining transactions. Additional transac-
tion costs occasionally may cause potential defendants to forego certain
transactions or at least reduce the volume of their negotiations. A lack
of legal regulation, however, is likely to make high-risk cooperative
moves even riskier and less frequent, thus driving potential plaintiffs
away from the bargaining table. It is unclear which danger imposes the
greater potential costs. Given the difficulty of solving the mixed-motive
puzzle and the specific type of opportunistic conduct addressed in this
Article, however, carefully circumscribed legal regulation seems
justified.
d. Dilution of Trustworthiness Signals
Precontractual investments serve two functions in the construction
of trusting relationships. They can signal both that a party is trustwor-
thy and that a party is willing to trust the other side. Imposing legal
sanctions on opportunistic behavior undermines the effectiveness of
these signals: the sanctions dilute the trustworthiness conveyed through
high-risk moves. Because the party receiving the signal knows that ex-
ploiting the risky behavior is subject to legal recourse, the precontrac-
tual investments are less risky and reveal less about the risk-taking
party.
If the legal system were perfect and all violations of trust could be
compensated fully, there would be no such thing as a high-risk step in
bargaining. People would act based on the threat of legal sanction, not
trust.3 9 In reality, however, precontractual investments remain risky
even when the law punishes opportunistic behavior because the costs of
bringing a suit based on opportunistic conduct are high, evidentiary
proof is uncertain, and actual recoveries often are limited in amount.
Thus, although the trust signal is weakened by legal regulation, the sig-
nal retains sufficient force to convey meaning in the trust-building
(1980).
238. Id.
239. N. LUHMANN, supra note 15, at 35 (stating that "trust cannot be reduced to trust in the




Moreover, as long as legal sanctions for breach of trust are not the
subject of explicit bargaining, these sanctions can serve a reassurance
function without poisoning the emerging atmosphere of trust. If, as le-
gal economists suggest, parties must secure express contractual protec-
tions regarding trustworthiness, the very process of securing these
protections is likely to put these parties on their guard.240
B. Toward a New Cause of Action: Opportunistic Breach of the
Bargaining Relationship
Assuming the law should deter opportunism during the precontrac-
tual period, one must ask whether the array of doctrines explored in
Part II adequately accomplish this purpose. These doctrines often re-
quire substantial manipulation to achieve the desired results, thereby
adding unnecessary cost and confusion to the deterrence of bargaining
opportunism.
One alternative to present doctrines would be the imposition of a
general duty of good faith on all parties in commercial negotiation.
Some commentators have argued that the courts should adopt this
standard.2 41 Others have suggested that some of the cases discussed in
Part II demonstrate an evolution by American courts toward a Euro-
pean, civil-law model of good faith in bargaining.
242
The analysis presented in this Article suggests that, from a purely
descriptive perspective, American courts are not as concerned with gen-
eral notions of good faith as they are with compensating victims of op-
portunistic conduct who have invested transaction-specific assets
during negotiation. Moreover, from a normative perspective, a legal re-
gime based expressly on a good faith standard appears ill-suited to pro-
vide the best legal protection against opportunistic conduct.
First, a regime based on good faith likely would be overbroad. A
vague good faith standard allows courts to punish not only opportu-
nism, but also any other conduct they consider unsavory or unethical.2 43
240. Id. at 36 (stating that the structure of a trusting relationship requires that the calcula-
tion regarding legal sanctions remain "latent. . . purely as a reassuring consideration").
241. See, e.g., Hassan, The Principle of Good Faith in the Formation of Contracts, 5 SUF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1980); Kessler & Fine, supra note 11, at 448-49; Note, A Call for a Com-
mon Law Culpa in Contrahendo Counterpart, 15 U.S.F. L. Rav. 587 (1981).
242. See, e.g., Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rav. 195 (1968); Note, Restructuring Breach of the Im-
plied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing As a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1291, 1316-18 (1985).
Other scholars looking at the same cases have rejected this view. See Farnsworth, supra note 10, at
285.
243. R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 44 (asserting that a general legal standard, "by vesting
broad discretion in the officials applying it .... opens the way to abuse"); Shell, Substituting
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Courts therefore might impose sanctions for bargaining ploys such as
withdrawing prior concessions or exaggerating statements of commit-
ment that some industries countenance without difficulty.
Second, a good faith regime would impose high costs on the bar-
gaining interaction because of uncertainty.244 Even after considerable
elaboration by the courts, a general doctrine of good faith likely would
be open-ended. Parties therefore would be forced to predict what con-
duct might offend particular judges or juries. Faced with this uncer-
tainty, some parties might forego bargaining altogether, and many
would spend resources attempting to contract around the good faith
standard.
A better alternative than either current doctrine or a good faith
standard would be to construct a new liability rule designed specifically
to deter the opportunistic bargaining conduct identified and discussed
in this Article. I propose that such a new cause of action be called "Op-
portunistic Breach of the Bargaining Relationship." Properly framed, it
would give parties and courts improved guidance in planning behavior
and deciding cases.
The doctrine of Opportunistic Breach of the Bargaining Relation-
ship that I have formulated poses four factual questions to determine
liability. First, it asks whether the disputed conduct stemmed from a
precontractual bargaining interaction. Gifts, discussions that do not
contemplate a commercial exchange, and attempts to renegotiate after a
contract is formed would not be covered by the proposed cause of
action.245
The second element asks whether the defendant signaled that the
parties dispense with formal contract law protections and conduct
themselves based on mutual trust. The defendant could make this sig-
nal by words, conduct, or even silence when commercial practice would
suggest a duty to speak. The explicit promise of a future contract or of
reimbursement for precontractual investments certainly would qualify
Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend,
82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1198, 1243 (1988).
244. R, POSNER, supra note 2, at 45 (asserting that the regime of general legal standards
makes it harder to predict the outcome of legal cases and adds "cost and disutility" to the legal
system); Shell, supra note 243, at 1242.
245. Parties who negotiate a series of discrete contracts over an extended period of time
would satisfy this element. Professor Narasimhan has demonstrated that negotiations of this sort
sometimes resemble renegotiations of existing contracts. See Narasimhan, Relationship or Bound-
ary, supra note 4, at 1077, 1085-86. Because an entirely new contract is at issue, however, and the
parties may be troubled by "last-period" incentives to behave opportunistically, see supra note
216, these cases should properly fall under the proposed rule. Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage
Co., 76 Wash. 2d 388, 457 P.2d 535 (1969), is an example of a judicial response to such a case. See
supra note 114; see also Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 351, 474 N.E.2d 1130 (1985)
(concerning a commercial lease renewal).
[Vol. 44:221
1991] TRUST IN NEGOTIATIONS 277
as such a signal. Many other forms of communication also could satisfy
this element. For example, assurances of trustworthiness and dependa-
bility, or suggestions that final approval of a contract is a mere formal-
ity, could be sufficient. Even apparently casual assurances between
parties with long-standing social ties might suffice.24 ' Reflecting the
Dravo holding, a complete absence of overt assurances may qualify
when accompanied by a request to reveal proprietary information or
perform costly services in furtherance of the parties' mutual interests.
24 7
The third element of the claim requires evidence that the plaintiff
took costly steps designed to further the parties' mutual interests. Re-
quiring proof of high-risk steps limits claimants to those who have in-
vested substantial assets in the trust-building process and minimizes
the danger that opportunists will bring spurious claims based on low-
risk investments.2 48 The costs of negotiation itself, including legal fees
and investigation expenses, are anticipated by both sides in commercial
246. The proposed doctrine of Opportunistic Breach of the Bargaining Relationship, consis-
tent with the psychological research reviewed in Part III, recognizes that social relations between
business parties contribute to the trust-building process. See supra notes 172-76 and accompany-
ing text. Courts therefore should give weight to this facet of the bargaining relationship. See, e.g.,
In re Phillips, 804 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a creditor with a 25-year social friendship
with debtor, based on shared church activities, was reasonable in relying on debtor's false repre-
sentation of acreage on deed); RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 686 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th
Cir. 1982) (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (pointing to evidence of a close friendship be-
tween negotiating parties as a factor supporting a finding of reasonable reliance); In re Paolino, 89
Bankr. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that a creditor was reasonable in relying on legal docu-
ments provided by debtor when the parties had a long social relationship and debtor's husband
was creditor's family doctor); Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965) (finding
a constructive trust based on a close business and personal relationship). But see Maguire v.
Holcomb, 169 Il. App. 3d 238, 523 N.E.2d 688 (1988) (finding no fiduciary duty between business
parties even though the parties had a long-standing social relationship and the defendant had been
a student-advisor to plaintiff five years previously); Eaton v. Sontag, 387 A.2d 33 (Me. 1978) (find-
ing that a social friendship of 15 years between buyers and sellers does not create a confidential
relationship).
247. In this respect, the proposed cause of action would cover more cases than would Profes-
sor Gergen's suggestion that courts use negligent misrepresentation to address cases arising from
precontractual reliance. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation requires a "statement of fact"). The proposed doctrine also disagrees with the suggestion
of the Second Circuit in Walton v. Morgan, Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980), that disclo-
sure of proprietary information during bargaining does nothing to change the arm's length nature
of an exchange. See supra note 68. The precise holding in Walton dealt with liability for insider
trading under the federal securities laws, a subject far beyond the scope of this Article. Finally, the
proposed cause of action is in sharp contrast with Professor David Charny's suggested reform of
promissory estoppel doctrine to require proof that a promise was made and that the promisee
"misapprehends the probability that the promisor will breach the promise or, though correctly
apprehending that probability, could not efficiently incur the costs of obtaining an enforceable
contract provision that anticipates the breach." Charny, supra note 47, at 456.
248. This requirement contrasts with the nominal reliance required under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts for claims of promissory estoppel. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTs § 90(1) (1981) (requiring only "action or forbearance") with RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS §
90 (1932) (requiring "action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character").
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transactions. Thus, they should not be considered transaction-specific
investments for purposes of determining whether this element is satis-
fied. The exclusion of normal negotiation costs from the category of
compensable precontractual investments is consistent with current
cases that have denied relief based solely on the loss of normal bargain-
ing expenses.2 49
The fourth and final element requires the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's action or omission caused the plaintiff's alleged loss. A
causation requirement is vital to filter out cases in which the plaintiff
acted out of personal necessity or desperation, rather than in response
to the defendant's behavior. If the court finds that the plaintiff would
have made the transaction-specific investments regardless of any acts or
omissions by the defendant, then the plaintiff's claim should fail.250 Af-
firmative proof on all four of the foregoing elements would entitle the
plaintiff to reliance damages.
The virtue of an explicit cause of action remedying precontractual
opportunistic behavior is that it defines the precise boundaries of a
form of recurring commercial misconduct that, until now, has been hid-
den beneath the surface of a wide variety of legal cases. The new claim
permits courts to evaluate the facts presented without having to fit the
parties' conduct into ill-suited doctrinal categories. For example, some
courts addressing promissory estoppel claims require strict proof that a
249. See, e.g., Gruen Indus. v. Biller, 608 F.2d 274, 282 (7th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that
"[e]very businessman faces the risk that the substantial transaction costs necessary to bring about
a mutually beneficial contract will be lost if the negotiations fall to yield a satisfactory agree-
ment"); In re MBA, Inc., 51 Bankr. 966, 972 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); Songbird Jet Ltd. v. Amax,
581 F. Supp. 912, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that no claim was stated for negotiation expenses
based on theory of unjust enrichment); see also Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 231. Damages for
negotiation expenses theoretically might be available under a claim of fraud if the plaintiff could
show that the negotiations were a complete sham designed solely to occupy the plaintiff while the
defendant undertook other activities. Research, however, has disclosed no such case. But cf. Gray
v. Eskimo Pie Corp., 244 F. Supp. 785 (D. Del. 1965) (plaintiff claimed that defendant kept plain-
tiff occupied in negotiations while defendant prepared to launch a competing product line, but the
complaint was dismissed because the court found as a fact that plaintiff did not rely on defend-
ant's representations regarding the prospects for a contract). In the highly specialized context of
government contracts, claims for negotiation expenses have been recognized when the federal gov-
ernment requests bids and then arbitrarily fails to choose the lowest bid. Disappointed bidders in
these situations may be entitled to recover their costs of bid preparation. See Heyer Prods. Co. v.
United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 238-39.
250. The court may find, for example, that the plaintiff's economic circumstances render
risky precontractual investments its only hope for survival. In that case the imposition of liability
for the plaintiff's losses would not support the trust-building process in commercial exchange. See,
e.g., Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D. Or. 1967) (holding that the
plaintiff could not recover under promissory estoppel because he made precontractual investments




promise was made.251 In some bargaining opportunism cases, this doc-
trinal requirement might cause a court to reject a legitimate claim or, at
the very least, spend resources canvassing other theories to see if an-
other doctrine could be stretched to fit the facts. The proposed cause of
action, by contrast, recognizes that transaction-specific investments rea-
sonably can be induced by conduct that falls short of an explicit prom-
ise. The proposed rule thus better describes the actual results of
bargaining opportunism cases. This adjustment should lead to more
certainty for parties when they are planning their conduct. Similarly,
the new cause of action eliminates the need to manipulate labels such
as arm's length bargaining and confidential relationships in cases based
on disclosure of proprietary information. As this Article has demon-
strated, the important question in these cases is whether the parties
have opted to construct a bargaining relationship based on trust, not
whether they initially approached each other as strangers. The pro-
posed cause of action lessens the likelihood that commercial parties will
act based on a false assumption that their arm's length bargaining posi-
tion will shield them from liability for opportunistic acts.
The use of a consistent, reliance-based measure of damages also
improves current doctrine. Courts facing bargaining opportunism claims
under unjust enrichment, for example, may undercompensate plaintiffs.
Earhart v. William Low Co. 2 notwithstanding, tinjust enrichment
damages typically are limited to benefits actually received, and the de-
fendant may not have benefited directly from the plaintiff's precontrac-
tual investments.
Current doctrines also overcompensate plaintiffs in some circum-
stances. Courts occasionally have awarded expectation damages based
on preliminary bargaining conduct.2 53 These awards, however, en-
251. See, e.g., Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc., 188 Mont. 455, 464, 614 P.2d 502, 507 (1980) (hold-
ing that the promise must be "clear and unambiguous"); Feinman, supra note 10, at 691 (stating
that some courts hold the view "that a statement that is not specifically demonstrative of an inten-
tion respecting future conduct or that is indefinite or limited cannot be the basis for promissory
estoppel").
252. 25 Cal. 3d 503, 600 P.2d 1344, 158 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1979); see supra notes 89-91 and
accompanying text.
253. A few courts have held that elaborate, time-consuming negotiations ultimately create a
duty to negotiate "in good faith," the breach of which results in a claim for lost expectation dam-
ages even in the absence of contract-specific investments. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity As'n
of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding case in which interest rates
plunged during loan negotiations causing borrower to refuse to close); Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416
F. Supp. 224 (N.D. MI1. 1976) (deciding case in which personality clashes developed between land-
lord and prospective tenant causing tenant to back out of deal). Most courts, however, have held
that complex negotiations do not create duties to negotiate in good faith or give rise to claims for
lost expectations, especially when the terms of a preliminary agreement or letter of intent reserve
the right of a party to back out. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir.
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courage parties to invest assets prematurely to trap their opponents
into what may be an unwanted deal. The remedy limitation in the new
opportunistic breach claim discourages behavior designed to lock par-
ties into unwanted contracts. 54 Prohibiting recovery of normal negoti-
ating expenses, moreover, discourages frivolous suits by parties that
simply are disappointed in the results of a conventional arm's length
negotiation.
These same policy considerations counsel against awarding puni-
tive damages for bargaining opportunism. Punitive damages clearly
would deter opportunistic conduct, but this deterrence would come at a
great cost to the commercial bargaining arena. First, parties might
avoid the arena altogether if faced with the prospect of punitive dam-
ages for precontractual behavior. Second, punitive awards would en-
courage plaintiffs with questionable claims to bring suit and gamble on
a favorable settlement, even if they reasonably cannot hope to prevail
at trial. Both effects would inhibit the communication and exchange
process considerably.
Certain parties, of course, may not want an informal negotiation
regime based on mutual trust. For reasons of clarity, certainty, or econ-
omy, these parties may prefer to bargain at arm's length with no inten-
tion to make transaction-specific investments themselves and no desire
to risk liability for investments incurred by the other side. Under the
proposed rule, parties must indicate this preference clearly and consis-
tently to avoid potential liability. Under current practice, parties easily
can communicate their preference through prominent disclaimers in let-
ters of intent and press releases. Parties wishing to proceed without any
risk of liability still should take care to avoid giving any impression to
their opponent that they want to proceed under a trust-based bargain-
ing regime.
Although parties should be free to "opt out" of the new claim,
courts should examine carefully the overall message sent by a party
before determining that explicit disclaimer language releases a defen-
dant from liability for its opponent's precontractual investments. The
1988); Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing district court hold-
ing that the defendant had a duty to negotiate in good faith and awarding lost expectation dam-
ages based on letter of intent), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); Bernstein v. Felske, 143 A.D.2d
863, 533 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1988) (finding no duty to negotiate in good faith when the preliminary
agreement was conditioned expressly on signing formal contract documents).
254. It is possible that the reliance measure of damages in a particular case will be measura-
ble only by the lost expectation of the victim of opportunism. In the construction bidding cases,
for example, the prime contractor's reliance on the subcontractor's bid results in damages that
equal expectation losses. See Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORmLL L.




presence of these investments suggests that, unless the investor was ir-
rational or desperate, it acted in response to a signal sent by the other
side or on the basis of some industry-wide convention. Depending on
the circumstances, boilerplate language in letters of intent and press
releases may be understood by the parties to be a formal bargaining
ritual played out for the benefit of third parties or constituencies, not a
substantive part of the business relationship. When these formalities
are contradicted by repeated assurances that mutual trust is the basis
for the negotiations, however, precontractual investments made in reli-
ance on trust should be protected from opportunism.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to fill gaps in both doctrinal and law and
economics literature dealing with contract formation. Doctrinal studies
have focused on the problems of negotiation misconduct, but have
failed to uncover any unifying theme that rationalizes the many judicial
responses to negotiation abuses. Law and economics scholars, mean-
while, have focused significant attention on the theme of opportunistic
conduct, but have failed to apply this concept to the precontractual pe-
riod. The Article has argued that the deterrence of opportunism is the
unifying theme missing from doctrinal studies of contract formation
and that, contrary to the assumptions of law and economics commenta-
tors, opportunism is a harmful feature of the precontractual stage of
business dealings. Complex commercial negotiations take place over a
period of time and often require parties to take sequenced steps that
expose them to losses before contract formation. The courts have used a
wide variety of legal doctrines to compensate parties who expose them-
selves to losses during negotiations and, consequently, are exploited by
their bargaining partners.
The law is not the only mechanism for deterring opportunistic be-
havior in negotiations. Some parties defend against opportunism
through their ability to discern and avoid potential opportunists.
Others may dodge opportunism by merging with other firms to inter-
nalize potentially opportunistic transactions. Primarily, parties rely on
the prospects for future dealings with each other and the market value
of reputation as incentives to bolster cooperation. This Article, how-
ever, has pointed out the shortcomings of these mechanisms in particu-
lar circumstances. Moreover, the Article has constructed a new cause of
action called "Opportunistic Breach of the Bargaining Relationship,"
which provides commercial parties with a clearer understanding of what
behavior troubles the courts.
The Article has argued that legal regulation of negotiation, either
under the existing rules or a new cause of action, is socially beneficial.
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Legal sanctions support a vital process of trust building that uses high-
risk steps as signals and encourages parties that prefer negotiation
based on trust to enter and remain in the bargaining arena. Research
findings by social psychologists and others who have studied the dy-
namics of interpersonal trust .strongly support the conclusion that
precontractual transaction-specific investments serve an important
function in the construction of durable commercial relationships. In-
deed, the role of trust in human interactions has implications not only
for the law governing commercial negotiations, but also for fields as
widely separated as relational contract theory, 5 5 economic analysis,2 6
and even feminist jurisprudence.257
As our society moves toward ever more mobile and competitive
markets, the traditional, nonlegal mechanisms for assuring trust are
likely to erode.2 58 As a result, the state increasingly will serve as a guar-
antor of the norms of human behavior. 25 9 This Article has shown that
the courts recognize the importance of trust in a vital form of commer-
cial interaction negotiation. The legal system's ability to recognize the
role of trust in other arenas of human activity will assume even greater
importance as we move into the next century.
255. The phenomenon of trust is important to relational contract theory. I. MAcNEIL, TaE
NEW SocIAL CoNTRACT 68, 74-75 (1980). Relational scholars, however, have not yet explored the
concept of trust in detail in any particular field of law.
256. Economists have recognized the importance of trust in commercial dealings. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text. Because trust is difficult to quantify, however, Dasgupta, supra
note 170, at 51 (asserting that "there are no obvious units in which trust can be measured"), econ-
omists have not accounted for trust adequately in most models of self-interested behavior. See A.
ETZiONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION 7-8 (1988) (discussing the inadequate treatment of trust by both
liberal and conservative economists).
257. Men and women appear to bring different amounts and perhaps kinds of trust to vari-
ous interactions. See H. RAIPFA, supra note 126, at 123 (asserting that women tend to be more
trusting and trustworthy than men in initial bargaining interactions but less likely to forgive viola-
tions of trust). Legal rules that reinforce and reward male trust tendencies might force women to
acquire unnatural and even inefficient modes of behavior.
258. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALX L.J. 704, 720
(1931) (observing that nonlegal forces holding society together fail with increases in mobility of
institutions, residence, and occupation).
259. See Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 Tax. L. REv. 103, 135 (1988)
(arguing that contract law serves as a "safety valve" for occasions when "informality fail[s]" and
that the law reinforces "relational norms"); Stookey, Trials and Tribulations: Crises, Litigation,
and Legal Change, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 497, 498 (1990) (remarking that under the "consensus
theory" of relationship between society and litigation, "litigation functions to achieve social inte-
gration when traditional forms of nonstate control weaken").
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